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ELEMENTARY STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: RETHINKING
LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND HISTORY
VICTORIA F. NOURSE *
Abstract: This Article argues that theorists and practitioners of statutory interpretation should rethink two very basic concepts—legislative intent and legislative history. Textualists urge that to look to legislative history is to seek an intent
that does not exist. This Article argues we should put this objection to bed because, even if groups do not have minds, they have the functional equivalent of
intent: they plan by using internal sequential procedures allowing them to project
their collective actions forward in time. What we should mean by legislative “intent” is legislative “context.” For a group, context includes how groups act—their
procedures. Once one accepts this position, we must rethink the very concept of
legislative history. Legislative history is not a search for a mental state, behind
the words, but a search for decisional context. We should give up talking about
legislative history, replacing it with the far more helpful notion of legislative decision and statutory context.
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Intent is unfortunately a confusing word.
—Dean James Landis

1

So taken are we with models derived from ordinary conversation, we are
inclined to ignore the formalities necessary for political discourse in a numerous and diverse society.
—Jeremy Waldron

2

Text without context often invites confusion and judicial adventurism.
—Senator Orrin Hatch

3

INTRODUCTION
It is often said that statutory interpretation assesses meaning. This is true
but incomplete. Poems and novels mean. Statutes are more than meanings.
People do not march or vote based on poems or novels. Some have suggested
that statutes are particular kinds of communicated meanings—commands to
judges and citizens. This is also true but incomplete. Such a view imagines law
made from “nowhere.” Statutes are decisions made in an electoral and procedural context. It is no exaggeration to say that, without that context, democracy
evaporates. A statute’s legitimacy in our constitutional order depends upon
context: that the law is the product of an elective, democratic process rather
than autocratic fiat.
Recently, I elaborated a theory of statutory interpretation foregrounding
legislative decisionmaking as essential to determining a statute’s meaning. 4
The claim of that theory is that text is central but cannot be understood without
looking at legislative context. Call this “legislative decision theory.” That theory is subject to two important objections. Textualists claim that Congress, as a

1

James M. Landis, A Note on “Statutory Interpretation,” 43 HARV. L. REV. 886, 888 (1930).
JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 70 (1999).
3
Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 43 (1988).
4
Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the
Rules, 122 YALE L. J. 70, 99 (2012). I originally described this as “decision theory” simpliciter. Id. at
73 n.4 (explaining this distinction). Here, I use the term “legislative” decision theory to distinguish it
from welfarist accounts. The term “decision” remains crucial as it more properly conveys the legitimacy of congressional processes, and avoids the deep ambiguities of the term “intent.” See infra notes
57–88 and accompanying text.
2
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group, can have no intent, 5 and that it follows that one cannot look beyond the
text. Call this the “group-intent objection.” Textualists also argue that the only
way to determine controlling text is by excluding legislative history. Call this
the “legislative history objection.” Purposivists are happy to invoke legislative
history. Nevertheless, purposivists have never set forth a consistent theory of
legislative history nor answered the “intent” question other than to substitute
“purpose” for intent. In this Article, I aim to illuminate both the “group intent”
and the “legislative history” objections.
First, this Article addresses the “group-intent objection.” Contrary to the
implications of both textualism and purposivism, Congress has the functional
equivalent of intent. Congress’s functional equivalent of intent, like that of any
group, depends upon sequential procedures. Procedures are how a group plans.6
The way to look at intent is not to imagine some meaning behind the meaning in
an individual’s head. Of course, Congress has no mind. 7 Congress’s procedures—its way of planning—is its way of having intent. When we consider
Congress’s intent, we are asking for the context in which Congress has legislated
and that includes, most importantly, procedural context.
Second, this Article addresses the legislative history objection. Any philosopher of language will tell you that plain meanings do not exist without an
understanding of the communicative context of the speaker.8 If I say “I take the
fifth,” it may seem “plain” to lawyers that I am talking about the Fifth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Nevertheless, that is only because listeners have added their own context—a legal and judicial context—to the statement. “I take the fifth” could as well mean the fifth amendment to a bill in the
Senate or the fifth doughnut in a line of doughnuts. Text, without context, can
be radically indeterminate, a mere vessel in which to pour judicial assumptions.
When Congress passes a statute, it does so against a background context
of rules, procedures and deliberation. That context does not exist in anyone’s
5
ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (Amy
Gutmann ed., 1997) (“Government by unexpressed intent is similarly tyrannical. It is the law that
governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.”).
6
The planning of an idea is of notable importance. For further discussion, see generally MICHAEL
E. BRATMAN, FACES OF INTENTION: SELECTED ESSAYS ON INTENTION AND AGENCY (Ernest Sosa et
al. eds., 1999); SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011).
7
As we will see, shifting from “intent” to “purpose” does not solve the problem. See infra notes
51–89 and accompanying text.
8
Semantic content is exceedingly sparse, as Scott Soames and other philosophers of language
have shown. Scott Soames, Vagueness in the Law, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 95, 97 (Marmor Andrei ed., 2012). Many statutes are written using terms that, from a philosopher’s perspective, are “extravagantly vague,” such as negligence or reasonableness. Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 18
(Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
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head: it is public and constitutionally sanctioned. 9 For years, we have called
this context by the term “legislative history,” but in fact that term is misleading
in a number of ways that will become evident. There are important differences
between statutory history (the history of the text of the statute), statutory usage
(the semantic content as understood by members of Congress), and public
documents sanctioned by the group (committee reports). Both textualism and
purposivism are poorer for failing to parse these different meanings of legislative history. Both should give up the notion that legislation operates according
to coherent narrative principles as if what Congress did was a “history.” Legislative “history” should be replaced with legislative “context,” informed by the
view that statutes are not stories, but elections.
In Part I of this Article, I argue that Congress does have the functional
equivalent of intent, but this requires us to jettison the standard “ghostly
minds” definition of “intent.” My argument rejects a claim that has captured
the imaginations of great legal minds from Max Radin10 to Ronald Dworkin 11
to Justice Antonin Scalia. If it is true that government by “unexpressed intent”
is decidedly tyrannical, 12 government by constitutionally supported procedures
is decidedly democratic. Next, I show how recent work in positive political
theory and philosophy on group agency supports my views and should render
us more skeptical of claims implying that groups—from Congress to Harvard—cannot act in ways we recognize every day.
In Part II of this Article, I address the all-or-nothing legislative history
debate. I argue that both textualists and purposivists need a more realistic and
disciplined understanding of legislative history. Basic notions like the fact that
statutes are elections—some texts win and some lose—must be incorporated
into the quest for legislative context. Lawyers and judges should stop imposing
narratives on a process that is built to be redundant and oscillating. This Article
9
See U. S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (providing that each House of Congress may “determine the rules of
its proceedings . . . .”).
10
See Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930) (arguing against
intent). As John Manning explained, “[t]he textualists’ intent skepticism can be traced to the work of
Max Radin, a noted legal realist.” John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2387, 2410 n.81 (2003) (recapitulating Radin’s argument against intent); see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365, 372–73 (1990) (discussing the textualists’ debt
to Radin).
11
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 314, 335–36 (1986) (“So long as we think legislative
intention is a matter of what someone has in mind and means to communicate by a vote, we must take
as primary the mental states of particular people because institutions do not have minds, and then we
must worry about how to consolidate individual intentions into a collective, fictitious group intention.”); see also RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 19 (2012) (arguing that
Dworkin asserts as a “tacit premise . . . that the legislature cannot have an intention because it is an
institution.”).
12
See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 17.
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concludes with a plea for more understanding about how statutes are made in
building any democratic theory of statutory interpretation.
I. THE GROUP-INTENT OBJECTION RECONSIDERED
It is no exaggeration to say that the two major theories of statutory interpretation judges use today—textualism and purposivism—are built upon the
conceptual ashes of “legislative intent.” Legal process theory—dominant in the
field for the last half of the twentieth century13—shifted the terrain to “purpose” because of realist critiques of “intent.” When textualism arrived in the
1980s, it put its arms around the realist critique declaring that Congress had no
intent—interpreters should look only at text. In both cases, textualists and purposivists launched their campaigns from the same conceptual starting place—
the question whether Congress could have an “intent.”
In this Part, I will consider that objection at length and respond that Congress does in fact have a functional equivalent of intent. I begin by providing a
background on legislative decision theory in Section A. In Sections B and C, I
examine the modern theoretical objections to intent and the meaning of intent.
In Section D, I explain why Max Radin’s view of intent was incorrect. This
Part concludes with a discussion of group intent and group agency.
A. A Brief Background in Legislative Decision Theory
If legislative decision theory were found on a bumper sticker, it might
read “Statutory Interpretation Finally Goes to Congress.” None of the primary
theories of statutory interpretation have a positive theory of how Congress
works. 14 Chapter 5 of Hart & Sacks’s The Legal Process, entitled “The Legislative Process,” weighs in at a healthy 314 pages, but less than five percent of
those pages deal with congressional rules or procedure. 15 Justice Scalia’s fa-

13
Legal process has been the preferred theory of those who propound it, such as Justice Stephen
Breyer, and the major target of those who reject it, such as Justice Antonin Scalia. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a Jurisprudence of Toggling Between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865 (2013) (discussing Justice Breyer’s and Justice
Scalia’s viewpoint on legal process theory). Both Justices were schooled in the technique at Harvard.
Id. at 866. Thus, it is not surprising that it would be dominant, in positive and negative forms, on the
Supreme Court. See id.
14
Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law, 65
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 123, 152 (1989) (“A normative theory of interpretation without a positive theory
of politics may lead us simply to defeat our own ends.”).
15
See generally HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS
IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1958) (discussing the legislative process, but devoting
little attention to congressional rules and procedures). To its great credit, the materials do address one
of Congress’s most important functions, appropriations, and reprint at length hearings on a matter
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mous Tanner lectures make mention of some congressional processes in a paragraph or two, ultimately deeming congressional intent impossible. 16
Legislative decision theory argues that the meaning of a federal statute
cannot be determined without knowing basic principles of Congress 101, 17
akin to the kind of knowledge accessible to a first year law student about the
elements of a trial. From there, it seeks to reverse engineer statutory text. Put
in other words, the theory looks for how textual decisions are made within the
context of a set of sequential decisions. 18 Knowledge of basic procedural
moves is essential context for understanding routine practices. Consider a
game of chess: if you tried to make sense of it, with no knowledge of the rules,
the players’ actions might seem strange chaotic moves on a checkered board.
Similarly, trying to make sense of a trial transcript without knowing the basics
of trial procedure could yield just as much confusion. So, too, it should seem
strange to try to understand Congress without understanding its institutional
procedures. 19 If one can teach students the fine-grained elements of the hearsay
rule, I am quite sure one can teach them the difference between a conference
report and a committee report.
Legislative decision theory differs from textualism. Like all theories of
statutory interpretation, it starts with the text. But it does not end with text. It
defines “textualism” as the practice of drawing boundaries around text and

involving flood insurance which, today after various tremendous hurricanes, appears surprisingly
relevant. See id. at 963–87.
16
SCALIA, supra note 5, at 31, 32. Justice Scalia writes, “[g]overnment by unexpressed intent is
similarly tyrannical. It is the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.” Id. at 17. Furthermore,
he posits that “with respect to 99.99 percent of the issues of construction reaching the courts, there is
no legislative intent.” Id at 32; see William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621, 651–52 (1990) (arguing that Justice Scalia adopted Radin’s critique against collective intention
and describing the notion “[t]hat a majority of both houses of Congress . . . entertained any view with
regard to [relatively minor] issues” as “utterly beyond belief”).
17
Legislative decision theory does not require that one cultivate the kind of knowledge of Congress akin to that of its most erudite students, just as knowledge of civil or appellate procedure does
not require memorization of the various rules governing the differing filing procedures for briefs in
differing courts of appeals.
18
See Nourse, supra note 4, at 93–98.
19
Some will reply that aspects of the process are well known, but, in fact, it is fairly evident from
caselaw that the most learned of jurists remain confused about the most basic congressional procedures. See id. at 94–95 (demonstrating that the Supreme Court did not consider the rules of Congress
when attempting to resolve ambiguous statutory language). Others will reply that the rules are only
part of a more complex process. It is often said that we live in an age of “unorthodox lawmaking” and
new forms of congressional procedures. But similar changes have occurred in the judiciary, for example, in civil procedure, without making nonsense of a trial’s basic sequential ordering. See BARBARA
SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS, at ix
(4th ed. 2012). For example, no one thinks that managerial judging means that motions come after
jury instructions. So, too, no one should think that in an age of unorthodox lawmaking cloture comes
before bill introduction.
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claiming that the text’s meaning can be exhausted by semantic content plus
syntax (and perhaps the text of similar statutes or canons). 20 By contrast, legislative decision theory argues that semantic meaning of congressional text requires resort to congressional context. Even when semantic content appears
clear from the face of the statute, the inquiry cannot stop. A faithful agent of
Congress must understand Congress’s meaning and that meaning can only be
found by looking to Congress’s textual decisions in procedural context. 21
Legislative decision theory also differs from purposivism. It focuses on
how textual decisions were made—what one might call statutory history, rather
than purposes. The point is not to roam around legislative history, but to target
the relevant point of decision. Legislative decision theory actually makes the
search for the point of decision easier and faster by targeting the relevant texts
(substantially aided by new computer databases),22 and starting the process
from the back-end of lengthy lawmaking efforts. This approach acknowledges
the vital importance of statutory ends—the “mischief” Blackstone once impor-

20

This is the definition I take to be used by textualists who draw a strong distinction between
textualism and purposivism. See John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1541, 1554 n.42 (2008) (“The main dividing line on the present Supreme Court is
between textualists, who emphasize the conventional semantic meaning of the enacted texts, and purposivists, who emphasize the goals that Congress sought to pursue in enacting the text.”). Textualists
maintain that they are not literalists in that semantic content may go beyond the “four corners of the
text” to include “specialized conventions and linguistic practices peculiar to the law,” as well as “offthe-rack canons of construction peculiar to the legal community,” which help to flesh out semantic
content. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70,
81, 82, 83 (2006).
21
Positive political theory supports this emphasis on procedure. We know, for example, that
whatever stability or equilibrium can be found in politics is a result of rule-following. See Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 27, 29 (1979) (“[I]nstitutional structure—in the form of rules of jurisdiction and amendment
control—has an important independent impact on the existence of equilibrium . . . .”). This was Kenneth Shepsle’s great insight in his rebuttal to logical claims made about democracy’s inherent irrational character associated with Kenneth Arrow’s cycling theorem. Id. Dan Rodriguez and Barry
Weingast, for example, have urged that it is irrational not to look to legislative history because legislative process provides more, rather than less, information about legislative meaning. Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative History: New Perspectives on
the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417, 1422–23 (2003). Unlike
some claims made by positive theorists, however, legislative decision theory is parsimonious. It requires no application of theories developed within the political science literature, voting patterns, or
concepts that would be difficult, if not impossible, for judges to apply.
22
Some argue not that intent is impossible as a logical matter, as did Radin, but as a practical
matter. See Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1839 (1998). The practicality objection deserves greater analysis but has been largely overtaken by technology. Computer databases now allow
precise searches for terms using a keyboard’s “Control F” function as a tool. I have timed students
while they found discussions of particular amendments, cloture, and particular terms. Searches that
would have once taken lengthy periods now take minutes.
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tuned statutory interpreters to identify. 23 But it argues that we only recur to
such reasoning as a matter of statutory construction rather than interpretation,
when all resources about textual meaning have been exhausted. 24
To both textualists and purposivists, legislative decision theory emphasizes the importance of legislative context in two ways. First, it insists that if one
is going to read legislative history, one should read it correctly. Second, and
more controversially, it argues that reading legislative history correctly is crucial to reading a statute’s text. In major statutory interpretation cases, both textualists and purposivist judges have misread legislative history in ways that
should be more obvious. No one confuses a dissenting opinion with a majority
opinion, nor should one confuse losers’ with winners’ legislative history. 25
Everyone knows that key amendments passed after basic provisions should be
considered very important text. Finally, some committees, namely conference
committees, cannot change bill text agreed upon by the House and the Senate.
Yet even textualists have failed to recognize that, in some cases, the text they
find so crucial, absurd and even unthinkable, is text any member of Congress
would devalue, harmonize, or ignore precisely because it was added by a part
rather than the whole of Congress. 26
To summarize: although this is not the venue in which to explicate the
normative bases of the theory, the point is to focus on democratic contexts rather than judicial ones. Without self-conscious judicial constraint, there is a
risk that judges will simply write the law that they want. If Congress’s context
is not considered, it will be the judge’s context that determines the choice of
text and its meaning. The question the interpreter must ask is: what did Congress decide? And that question cannot be answered if one does not know the
rules by which Congress makes decisions. At the very least, one cannot be a
faithful agent to a principal to whom one has sworn willful (textualist) or lazy
(purposivist) blindness.

23

1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *58,*61.
When purposivists attribute a purpose to Congress, they are imposing, not finding, Congress’s
meaning. This may be a proper theory of statutory construction. There are good reasons to believe, for
example, that a purposivist inquiry catches legislative meaning at its likely level of generality. If one
is to attribute meaning to members, there are reasons to believe that members are likely to understand
and communicate the meaning of legislation in broad, generalist, terms. Rather than a fine-grained
analysis of text, they are likely to vote on how the bill will be seen by voters, who are not experts in
legal texts.
25
Nourse, supra note 4, at 75.
26
See id. at 94–95 (further elaborating on this idea).
24
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B. Modern Theoretical Objections To Legislative Intent
It should seem strange that we still talk of legislative intents rather than
legislative decisions. We write easily of Supreme Court decisions as “decisions.” That the Supreme Court may change its “mind”—that the Court may
overturn its own precedent—does not prevent us from calling its work “a decision.” That the decision is partial—that the Court may divide 5-4—does not
prevent us from calling its work “a decision.” That the decision is in part delegated—that the Court allows clerks to draft opinions—does not prevent us
from calling its work “a decision.” We dub the Supreme Court’s written work a
“decision”—however subject to change or division or delegation—because its
action has a finality within the judicial world. All of this could be said, but is
not, of Congress’s decisions in committee reports or in text, which have meaning within a legislative world. Reports and votes and text are public acts, even
though subject to revision, delegation or complete reversal. And, yet, there is
no more basic linguistic practice in statutory interpretation than describing
these public acts as “legislative intent.”27
The term “legislative intent” is as ancient as American28 and British statutory interpretation. 29 Nowhere is its meaning more important, however, than
when it comes to the “group-intent objection”— the claim that Congress can
27
One might ask why we do not look for the Supreme Court’s intent. In fact, we do: when the
meaning of a Supreme Court decision is unclear, or even unfortunate or contentious, we quickly resort
to procedural context to determine meaning. So, for example, if a concurring fifth vote is necessary to
reach a result, the opinion of a single justice may become the meaning of the Court. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 660 (1952). This follows from the basic procedural
principle that a decision of the Court is a decision by a majority of the members of the Court. One
might contend that, even if this is true, one does not look “behind” individual opinions to “cert” memos and other pre-opinion documents to find meaning. We do not do this for the same reasons we do
not look to individual representatives’ statements to find the meaning of a majority-passed statute; an
individual justice has no authority to speak for the Court, just as individual senators have no authority
to speak for the U.S. Senate. As this footnote shows, in cases where meaning is uncertain and matters,
we do look “behind” the meaning of a majority opinion to find the central “agreed-upon” doctrine,
even to the extent of relying upon the opinion of an individual justice. Rules matter to meaning.
Change the rules of majority voting in the court and you will change the meaning of a decision. We
might, for example, have a rule that a precedent only existed if there were nine votes or six votes, in
which case our understanding of the meaning of a 5–4 decision would change. Indeed, it would be no
decision at all.
28
See Helms’ Lessee v. Howard, 2 H. & McH. 57, 94 (Md. 1784) (“The intent of the legislature
is to be collected from all parts of the act.”); Robin v. Hardaway, 1 Jeff. 109, 118 (Va. 1772) (quoting
Blackstone on the “intent of the legislature”).
29
See BLACKSTONE, supra note 23, at *59 (“The fairest and most rational method to interpret the
will of the legislator, is by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made, by signs the
most natural and probable.”); see also THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, ch. XXVI, at 133 (Empire
Books 2011) (1651) (“[I]t is not the Letter, but the Intendment, or Meaning; that is to say, the authentique Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of the Legislator,) in which the nature of the Law
consisteth.”); see also JOHN FINNIS, AQUINAS 255–58, 257 n.19 (1998).
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have no intent. 30 The “group-intent objection” was first proposed in a seminal
article written in the 1930s by the realist-skeptic Max Radin. 31 His argumentative ax was blunt: A group legislature has no intent precisely because of its collective character: 32 “[t]he intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any
real sense . . . .” 33 Radin’s critique has become a classic in the legal theory of
realism. For our purposes, the argument is more important for its extraordinary
lasting power and extravagant effect on statutory interpretation theory. Citation
to Radin is ubiquitous by both textualists and purposivists. 34
In the 1980s and 1990s, Justice Scalia embraced Radin’s critique as the
baseline from which to launch his plea for textualism and against purposivism:
there being no collective intent, text alone should govern. 35 Of course, Radin,
the left-wing realist-skeptic, would have been shocked to learn that his approach had been appropriated by an avowed formalist conservative. 36 This reversal of fortune, nevertheless, was made possible, in part, because of intellec30

See Radin, supra note 10, at 870 (proposing the “group intent objection”).
See generally Radin, supra note 10.
32
Id. at 870.
33
Id. For purposes of this Article, I define the thesis in these terms: Radin (and his followers) do
not think it literally impossible to form a group intent; instead, they demand that each person in the
group have the same mental state, so that it is practically impossible. See id. My thanks to Larry Solum for making this point to me.
34
For only some of the citations to Radin’s intent argument by two prominent statutory interpretation figures, see the work of purposivist William N. Eskridge, Jr. and textualist John F. Manning.
See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1507
n.113 (1987); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609,
635 n.118 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007, 1012 n.13 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 332 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Case of the
Speluncean Explorers: Twentieth-Century Statutory Interpretation in A Nutshell, 61 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1731, 1736 & n.32 (1993) [hereinafter Eskridge, Speluncean Explorers]; Eskridge, supra note
16, at 642; John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L. REV. 419, 430 (2005); John
F. Manning, The Necessary and Proper Clause and Its Legal Antecedents, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1349,
1364 (2012); John F. Manning, The Role of the Philadelphia Convention in Constitutional Adjudication, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1753, 1761 & n.37 (2012); Antonin Scalia & John F. Manning, A Dialogue on Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1610, 1611–12 (2012).
35
See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 651–52 (“[H]is attack was primarily a realist one. Thus, Judge
Scalia followed the Radin critique of the concept of legislative intent.”).
36
Radin’s left-wing sympathies were opposed by conservatives of his day. See Hans A. Linde,
Hercules in a Populist Age, 103 HARV. L. REV. 2067, 2069 (1990) (reviewing JOSEPH R. GRODIN, IN
PURSUIT OF JUSTICE (1989)) (noting that “in 1939 a conservative attorney general, Earl Warren,
blocked confirmation of an eminent Berkeley professor, Max Radin, for alleged left-wing sympathies,” for a position on the California Supreme Court). Justice Scalia’s conversvative leanings are
well known. See 60 Minutes: Justice Scalia on the Record, (CBS television broadcast Apr. 27, 2008),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/justice-scalia-on-the-record/, archived at http://perma.cc/
RM5L-5LBU (“I mean, I confess to being a social conservative, but it does not affect my views on
cases.”); see also JOAN BISKUPIC, AMERICAN ORIGINAL: THE LIFE AND CONSTITUTION OF SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 76 (2009) (recounting Justice Scalia describing his life as a conservative before becoming a justice as “isolated, lonely . . . like a weirdo.”).
31
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tual failure. The dominant school of thought in statutory interpretation, the legal process school, pioneered in the Hart and Sacks materials, 37 never answered Radin’s skeptical critique in a way satisfying to scholars of statutory
interpretation. Having left it standing, the legal process school was soon impaled by it.
At first glance, it might seem as if Hart and Sacks’s move to “purpose”
answered Radin’s challenge. But, as Radin’s own article makes quite clear,
substituting purpose for intent does not, as a conceptual matter, take care of
the matter of group agency. Radin’s critique against a “group intent” applies as
well to “group purposes.” If there can be no collective intent, there can be no
collective purpose. In fact, at least as far as the collectivity critique, there appears no difference between the terms “purpose” and “intent.” 38
Hart and Sacks recognized this, emphasizing the complexity of attributing
a purpose to a statute and explaining that the legislature could have multiple
purposes. 39 They argued that a judge could determine the most reasonable purpose, the one offering a law’s best account. Hart and Sacks shifted from a
speaker’s meaning view to a listener’s meaning view, moving the debate from
statutory interpretation (the discovery of meaning) to statutory construction

37

HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 89. Hart and Sacks were not alone in their advocacy of purposivism. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L.
REV. 527, 538–39 (1947). Nevertheless, their “exceptional” materials on legal process have “provided
the name, the agenda, and much of the analytical structure for a generation of legal thought.” William
N. Eskridge Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical Introduction to The Legal Process, in
HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at lii. Purposivists recognized the claim that legislatures may not have
anticipated particular, specific results, and sought to use “purpose” to solve that problem. See Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 374 (1947)
(arguing that even though legislatures form no specific intent concerning many interpretive controversies, judges may, nonetheless, resolve doubtful uses by reference to “the general purpose” that lies
“behind the statutory words”); HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 89 (questioning whether, during a
“general codification of the law of inheritance,” the “likelihood that the legislature . . . consciously
said to itself . . . ‘as an incident of all the other things we are now doing, we are here deliberately
deciding,’” the specific question whether the murdering heir should receive an inheritance); id. at 92–
93 (contrasting an approach seeking the “intention of the legislature” on the “question” before the
court with an approach which deemed the court bound to background “principles and policies” unless
it had made a different “purpose” “clear openly and responsibly”); John F. Manning, Textualism as a
Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 677 n.11 (1997) (“[T]hose who focus on general
purpose stress the difficulty in reconstructing specific intent.”) (emphasis added).
38
Radin, supra note 10, at 878 (“[T]o interpret a law by its purposes requires the court to select
one of a concatenated sequence of purposes, and this choice is to be determined by motives which are
usually suppressed.”). If one carries purpose as far as it will go, “the avowed and ultimate purposes of
all statutes, because of all law, are justice and security.” Id. at 876.
39
See HART & SACKS, supra note 15, at 1378 (recommending that the interpreter assume that the
“legislature was made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably”); see id. at
1188–96, 1374–77 (suggesting that prototypical instances of statutory application can evoke multiple
purposes).
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(the determination of legal effect).40 Hart and Sacks’s solution may well be one
followed by today’s great purposivist judges, 41 but it has never quieted purposivism’s critics. Textualist detractors emphasize that purposivism expands
the domain of statutes. Furthermore, there are “multiple purposes” to any statute and, therefore, the attribution of a single purpose may be arbitrary or activist. 42 At the very least, the “multiple purpose” critique has been a prominent
arrow in the quiver of objections against purposivism. 43
If nothing else, no one can say that skepticism about groups because of
their collective nature has gone away. If anything, it has intensified over time
because it has been repeated, and sometimes endorsed, by the greats of modern
jurisprudence and political science. Ronald Dworkin recapped the argument
almost verbatim in his work, calling it the “speakers’ meaning” view. 44
Dworkin claimed, just like Radin, that the multiplicity of the legislature made
it impossible to collect an original intent. 45 Jeremy Waldron picked this up in

40
See Lawrence B. Solum, Orginalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
453, 455–56 (2013); Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 95, 95 (2010).
41
See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 85–101 (2005) (defending purposive interpretation).
42
See, e.g., John F. Manning, The New Purposivism, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 113, 151–52 (discussing Radin’s famous identification of the multiple purpose “conceptual” problem). This is sometimes
called the problem of generality after Radin’s claim that one could state the purpose of all laws at a
very high level of generality as “justice and security.” See id.; see also Radin, supra note 10, at 876
(stating that “the avowed and ultimate purposes of all statutes, because of all law, are justice and security”); Stephen F. Williams, Rule and Purpose in Legal Interpretation, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 809, 811
(1990) (“Notice that as soon as the analysis of purpose is divorced from the means selected, all limits
are off. Every purpose can always be restated at a higher level of generality.”). Whether described as
the “generality” problem or the “multiple purpose” problem, the claims made here remain the same.
43
See Eskridge, Speluncean Explorers, supra note 33, at 1744–45 (explaining the critique of
purposivism: “that purpose is too easy to determine, yielding a plethora of purposes, cross-cutting
purposes, and purposes set at such a general level that they could support several different interpretations. Purposive statutory interpretation, therefore, might be even less determinate than more traditional approaches. This has been a standard criticism of legal process interpretation . . . .”).
44
See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 314, 315 (“When a friend says something, we may ask, “What
did he mean by that?” . . . Our answer to that question describes something about his state of mind
when he spoke.”). Under the “speakers’ meaning” view, judges look to legislative history . . . to discover what “state of mind” the legislators tried to communicate. Id. Legislative materials are “evidence” of the legislators’ “mental states.” Id. at 314. So long as we think legislative intention is a
matter of what someone has in mind and means to communicate by a vote, we must take as primary
the mental states of particular people because institutions do not have minds. See id. at 314–15.
Dworkin misunderstood the notion of speaker’s meaning derived from the philosophy of language,
which focuses on the meaning the speaker intended to convey to her audience based on the audience’s
recognition of the speaker’s communicative intentions. See H.P. Grice, Utterer’s Meaning, SentenceMeaning, and Word-Meaning, in 4 FOUNDS. OF LANGUAGE 225, 225, 230 (1968).
45
See DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 320–21. Under Dworkin’s theory, a judge is required to
“combine . . . various opinions into some composite group intention.” Id. at 320. “[W]e must worry
about how to consolidate individual intentions into a collective, fictitious group intention.” Id. at 336.
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more sophisticated fashion. 46 His principal target was constitutional interpretation, but in a long chapter on statutory interpretation he repeated Radin’s
claims about collectivity as inconsistent with intent.47 Finally, the great Kenneth Shepsle gave positive political theory’s imprimatur to the “group-intent
objection” with the very title of his paper, “Congress is a They, Not an It.” 48
C. Analyzing the Meaning of Intent—Three Modalities
The “group-intent objection” is correct in a trivial, semantic sense, but
deeply wrong in an important, empirical sense. By definition, no group has a
single human mind. Few dispute that proposition; it is a trivial claim. It is not a
trivial claim, however, to eliminate groups from our social life. That is an extravagant argument amounting to the rejection of most of our social world,
from Microsoft to Harvard to the Catholic Church. To see this, we must first be
clear about the meaning of “intent.” Bottom line: there is such a thing as legislative intent, but only if we define intent in a way that does not carry with it
embedded assumptions that, by definition, only apply to individuals. Congress
has the functional equivalent of intent by acting through its sequential procedures. When we ask about Congress’s intent, what we are asking for is not its
mental state, but an elaboration of its actions within the procedural context in
which it acted.
For some time now, scholars in jurisprudence, statutory interpretation and
political economy have questioned whether collectivities “intend” in any way
other than a metaphorical sense. As explained earlier, the philosopher Jeremy
Waldron and before him Ronald Dworkin49 have argued against the concept of
legislative intent, views that have been echoed in different forms by Joseph
Raz and John Gardner. 50 Recently, however, the philosopher Phillip Pettit and
political economist Christian List have provided the conceptual foundation for
46

See Waldron, supra note 2, at 128.
See id.
48
Kenneth Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 254 (1992). This is not the uniform view among political scientists as
others embrace legislative intent. See Rodriguez & Weingast, supra note 21, at 1422–23.
49
DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 19 (arguing against collective intention); WALDRON, supra note 2,
at 119–46; see John Gardner, Some Types of Law, in COMMON LAW THEORY 51, 56 n.14 (Douglas E.
Edlin ed. 2007) (identifying Dworkin and Waldron as “[n]otable doubters” of the thought that an
institution may have intentions).
50
JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND
PRACTICAL REASON 284 (2009) (arguing that law is intentional, but the intention involved in the act
of legislating is “very minimal” and “does not include any understanding of the content of the legislation”); Gardner, supra note 49, at 56. (arguing that “parliament often has no intention to make the
particular changes in the law that it ends up making when it legislates,” but has a more humble intention to act to change the law). This may be akin to the notion I suggest below, that intention may be
used to describe an act that is not involuntary or accidental. See infra note 72.
47
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an important response to these claims. List and Pettit decry as “extreme” the
idea that collectivities have no group agency, branding it “eliminativism.” 51
Eliminativists reject the agency of a vast range of entities within the social
world with which we interact on a daily basis and to whom we attribute agency
and thus responsibility. 52 Eliminativists, in short, have gone too far in eradicating social life.
If this is correct, there are important implications for the “group-intent objection.” If the argument claims that Congress is a collectivity and because it is
a collectivity it cannot act as a group agent, then the argument assumes what it
is trying to prove and eliminates group agency. What do I mean by group agency? In this Article, I use this term to mean public action, recognized by those
inside the group as legitimate group acts. When a corporation issues a report
and members within the group recognize and attribute this to the group according to pre-determined standards, the group itself considers this as a group act
(its ex ante procedures determine this). Acts differ from intents, meanings, and
beliefs because they are observable and do not exist solely in one or more
minds. Putting on one’s shoes is different from thinking about putting on one’s
shoes and telling someone else that you are about to put on your shoes. That an
act may take the form of speech or words does not deny it the status of an act
as distinct from a mere mental state. 53
An act that the group would recognize as a group action (i.e. authorized
by the group or part of that group’s organization or procedure) is an exercise of
group agency. 54 This is a descriptive and a prescriptive claim in the following
sense. Just as trial procedures make sequential processes legitimate as part of
51

CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY 74 (2011) (“If the emergentist tradition
reified and mystified group agents, hailing them like transcendent realities, the eliminativist tradition
went to the other extreme.”).
52
Id. at 5 (“Once we recognize a collective entity as an agent, we can interact with it, criticize it,
and make demands on it, in a manner not possible with a non-agential system.”). Margaret Gilbert has
used the term “singularism” to describe a similar phenomenon. MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL
FACTS 12, 433 (1989); see LIST & PETTIT, supra note 51, at 74 (“Singularism asserts that there are no
pluralistic agents, in any literal sense of the term, only the singular agents constituted by individual
human beings . . . .”).
53
J.L. Austin, Performative Utterances, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 291, 292 (A.P. Martinich & David Sosa eds., 6th ed. 2013).
54
For example, just as a corporate report, such as a 10K filing, is viewed as a legitimate group
action even though it may have been written by a part of the organization, and never be read by the
Board of Directors, so too similar actions (committee reports) should be viewed as legitimate public
acts of Congress, not mental states. This applies to acts attributable to individuals as well as collective
acts. When an individual offers an amendment, the amendment is his own, but to be a legitimate
group act, it must follow group-authorized procedure. On the other hand, an offhand statement made
by an individual legislator or a colloquy that did not follow the rules would not be considered a group
act. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 665–67 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Whether the
floor statements are spoken where no Senator hears, or written where no Senator reads, they represent
at most the views of a single Senator.”).
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the trial without regard to the outcome, congressional procedures make intermediate steps in the process legitimate because there has been a prior commitment by the group to act in this particular way—no matter who wins or loses. The prior commitment legitimizes the act and also delegitimizes acts that
do not follow such procedures as acts that the group may disavow or which
may be later deemed to fall outside the arena of group action. Consider, for
example, two rogue employees writing a false 10K report inflating the value of
a company, or two rogue Senators making speeches giving a false context to a
statute. 55 Claims to act for a group are not automatically legitimate, but must
be consistent with prior procedural, and within this sense, normative commitments.
1. Three Modalities of Intent
Intention is everywhere in life and law, and it is “confusing.” 56 Philosophers have debated, and continue to debate, the meaning of intention.57 So, too,
do linguists and literary theorists and intellectual historians.58 More recently,
psychologists and social psychologists have entered the field with experimental evidence suggesting that the attribution of intention begins at the earliest of ages. 59 For some time now, we have known that humans are particularly
adept at reading the “minds” of others.60 At a minimal level, it seems undeniable that Congress acts with some intention. Few believe that statutes appear by
accident. Votes are not delivered at the point of a gun. However, once one
55

Id. at 666.
Landis, supra note 1, at 888.
57
See generally G. E. M. ANSCOMBE, INTENTION (2nd ed. 1963) (providing a seminal philosophical analysis of intention); BRATMAN, supra note 6 (discussing intention generally and in the context
of shared cooperative activity); DANIEL C. DENNETT, THE INTENTIONAL STANCE (1989) (presenting a
theory of intentionality and mind); JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1983) (explaining intentional phenomena); Kieran Setiya, Intention, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2014), http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/spr2014/entries/intention/, archived at http://perma.cc/BXS4-HPF9 (discussing theories
of intention).
58
See PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 86–116 (1989); MEANING & CONTEXT:
QUENTIN SKINNER AND HIS CRITICS 73–78 (James Tully, ed. 1989). See generally INTENTIONS AND
INTENTIONALITY: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION (Bertram F. Malle et al. eds., Bradford
Books 2003) (2001) (providing analyses of intention by psychologists, social psychologists and philosophers).
59
Amanda Woodward et al., How Infants Make Sense of Intentional Action, in INTENTION AND
INTENTIONALITY: FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL COGNITION, supra note 58, at 150–51 (summarizing
existing theories and contending that “infants, before they acquire the communicative tool box of the
12–24-month-old, understand some aspects of intentional action”).
60
See DENNETT, supra note 57, at 51 (“[F]olk psychology . . . can explain the fact that we do so
well predicting each other’s behavior on such slender and peripheral evidence; treating each other as
intentional systems works . . . because we really are well designed by evolution . . . .”).
56

1628

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 55:1613

passes this “minimalist” threshold, serious arguments arise about the existence
of group intent. Here, my hope, if nothing else, is to bring greater clarity to the
arguments about intent based on a new typology of intent modalities. Ultimately, I hope to show how assumptions about particular intent modalities may lead
to simplistic, and question-begging, views about Congress as a group agent,
and that these modalities are not the only ones possible.
a. Mental Intent
When I say that I “intend to do something,” the reader is likely to think of
a mental state. This is especially true in law, where mental states play such an
important role in tort and criminal law. 61 When lawyers seek “legislative intent” they sometimes mean that what they are looking for is to “reconstruct[]”
the mental state of the members who would have voted on a bill. 62 They are
talking of intent as mental state. Philosophers note that it is not necessary for
the individual to have a sign in his head saying “I intend to do something,” as
lawyers often posit. An individual may in fact do something automatically—
without a “mental event”—in which case the intention and the act coincide.
Put another way, the mental states that constitute an intention can be dispositional; they need not be occurrent. For example, lawyers trying to prove state
of mind do not expect to discover a picture of the brain, but infer “intent” from
action or behavior. 63 Whereas, in the field of statutory interpretation, the general view holds to the notion that there is a separate “mental event” associated
with the creation of statutory text.
b. Communicative Intent
Intent-as-communication is a staple of standard versions of statutory interpretation theory. 64 Dworkin explained this notion (one he disavowed), 65 as the

61
See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 118–19 (6th ed. 2012) (describing mens rea (the latin term associated with intent) and discussing the concept of murder as the
“intentional killing of a human being”).
62
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983) (“I suggest that the task for the judge called upon to interpret a statute is
best described as one of imaginative reconstruction.”).
63
See DENNETT, supra note 57, at 15 (“[T]he intentional strategy consists of treating the object
whose behavior you want to predict as a rational agent with beliefs and desires and other mental stages.”).
64
See Richard A. Posner, Legislation and Its Interpretation: A Primer, 68 NEB. L. REV. 431, 448
(1989) (positing a hypothetical involving a commander giving garbled orders).
65
DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 315–16. Dworkin’s target is the species of constitutional argument
known as originalism, but his arguments are couched in more general interpretive guise and are in part
focused on statutory interpretation. See id. at 313–54.
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“speaker’s meaning” view. 66 That view “assumes that legislation is an occasion
or instance of communication.” 67 The “ruling model of this theory is the familiar
model of ordinary speech.” 68 In ordinary speech, as linguists, literary theorists
and others have shown, it is common sense to hold that statements are made with
the purpose to communicate. As Stanley Fish, one of intent-as-communication’s
most zealous 69 interpretive defenders explains, “interpretation always and necessarily involves the specification of intention.”70 Under the idea of intent as
“communication,” “[e]veryone who is an interpreter,” including statutory analysts, is in “the intention business.”71 This view is distinct from the mental state
approach because it requires the conveyance of meaning from one party to another: one can have a mental state (for example, a secret wish) and yet never
communicate that internal state to another.72 This modality thus raises the potential for a mistaken attribution of intention, faulty communication of that intention, as well as improper uptake on the part of the listener. 73
c. Pragmatic Intent
A different meaning of intent focuses on the communicative situation.
Pragmatism, in its original philosophical sense, takes the view that one cannot
know one’s ends without acting to achieve those ends. Intent under such a
view is not merely a mental state but a mental state contemplating “present and
future conduct,” 74 and, more importantly, may not be knowable except by observing action in context—in the situation. Contrary to the “snapshot picture”—frozen in time—of mind or communication, under this pragmatic idea
of intent, intents may change over time as new and relevant information be66

Id. at 315.
Id.
68
Id.
69
Stanley Fish, The Play of Surfaces, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 300–01 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992) (“[T]here cannot be a distinction between interpreters who
look to intention and interpreters who don’t, only a distinction between the differing accounts of intention put forward by rival interpreters . . . .”).
70
Id. at 300. Fish is debating constitutional interpretation in this piece, but his statements are
equally applicable and have been invoked to explain the speaker’s meaning theory in other contexts.
WALDRON, supra note 2, at 124–25.
71
Fish, supra note 69, at 301.
72
I am rejecting a theory of communication here in which the speaker encodes and the listener
decodes the utterance. That theory would allow for secret intentions that no listener could have
grasped. Instead, the theory of communication asserted here depends upon the communicative intentions of the speaker. See GRICE, supra note 58, at 86–116.
73
See Elizabeth Mertz, Teaching Lawyers the Language of Law: Legal and Anthropological
Translations, 34 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 91, 102–04 (2000).
74
BRATMAN, supra note 6, at 2. Intentions are “elements of stable, partial plans of action concerning present and future conduct.” Id. Intending involves “a commitment . . . over time . . . .” Id. at
4.
67
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comes available. 75 Like pragmatist theories of meaning more generally, pragmatic intent is context-relative—it focuses on the communicative situation. 76
Background context will influence the intention or plan. For example, one
cannot know how to win a game of chess if one does not know the background
context—the rules of chess or the significance of the checkered board within
the context of those rules. The pragmatic intent modality assumes that unstated
background context is important; it is not enough that intent is a mental state or
a communicated mental state. Pragmatic intent emphasizes communicative
context as essential to find meaning. In sum, if one can infer intent from action, the first two modalities are neither necessary nor sufficient to understand
intent.
This applies to both ordinary meaning and statutory meaning. Consider
the sentence “I take the fifth.” Lawyers are likely to assume that an individual,
within a court of law, has refused to testify. This understanding assumes a crucial context. If that context is changed, the statement’s meaning changes. “I
take the fifth” as a response to the question in a bakery “which one will you
take?” might mean the fifth doughnut or, in the context of waiting for a taxi,
the fifth car in line. In the context of the Senate, it might mean the fifth
amendment, not to the Constitution, but to the bill under consideration. These
examples show how assumptions made from context are extraordinarily common and potentially crucial to determine meaning. As Professors Goldsworthy
and Ekins have written, “[i]f presuppositions are not grasped, almost anything
we say is open to being misunderstood in unpredictable and bizarre ways.” 77
To modify one example discussed by Goldsworthy and Ekins and originated
by John Searle: if I order a hamburger in a restaurant, I assume that the hamburger will be cooked at a sufficient temperature so as not to make me sick,
that it was refrigerated to remain fresh before cooking, and that it will be
cooked not frozen or, as Searle originally noted, encased in a solid Lucite cube. 78 We know this from context, not logic—from the procedures by which
hamburgers are typically ordered and prepared.
To the extent that statutes are valid commands, they must be uttered within a particular context pursuant to particular rules and processes, not at a baseball game or a theatrical performance (different contexts with different rules).79
75

Id. at 2 (“[M]any times, in the face of new and relevant information, we recognize that it would
be folly to stick rigidly with our prior intention.”).
76
Id. at 21; GRICE, supra note 58, at 222.
77
Richard Ekins & Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The Reality and Indispensability of Legislative Intentions, 36 SYDNEY L. REV. 39, 55 (2014).
78
Id. at 56 n.61 (citing JOHN R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING: STUDIES IN THE THEORY
OF SPEECH ACTS 127 (1979)).
79
To the extent that statutes are seen as commands, they are performatives and are subject to
Austin’s original analysis which holds that performatives only work if they are consistent with ex ante
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Although context is important in understanding ordinary speech, statutory
speech operates in a particularly “formalistic” context, to borrow Jeremy Waldron’s term. 80 As we know from the linguist Paul Grice, ordinary speech conventions generally assume that information will be limited and relevant, but no
such assumption is warranted in the Senate because its procedures allow unlimited speech. 81 So, too, it is generally assumed that ordinary speakers are
cooperating with each other—an assumption that becomes outlandish in the
context of a legislative debate between warring parties. 82 Because congressional procedure often suspends the maxims of ordinary speech, rules for ordinary speech may be necessary but are not sufficient to understand congressional meaning.
Perhaps most importantly for purposes of the group intent objection, 83
pragmatic intent is not (like our earlier versions of intent) inherently singularist 84—it is not limited to a single individual at a moment in time. Instead, it
contemplates acting with more than one person over time. Once one acknowledges that intent may be reflected in action, it is possible to imagine “weintentions.” 85 So, for example, two people can agree in advance to tie each
rules for the performance. See Austin, supra note 53, at 293. So, if I say “I divorce you” in a cocktail
party setting, the performance will not “come off”—no one would think that my mere statement of the
words “I divorce you” would effectuate a legal divorce because it did not comply with the proper
procedures for a legal divorce, and was not uttered in the proper context for a legal divorce. Id. As
Austin explained, the performative utterance will be “unsatisfactory . . . if certain rules, transparently
simple rules, are broken.” Id. Put in other words, Austin’s theory of performatives assumes conformance with rule-context. For example, an opera singer could utter the words of a statute at an opera and
no one would think it was a command to the audience but instead a performance of an opera (or at
most the performance of a command within an opera). For a statute to be a statute—a valid command—it must be consistent with the procedures by which the people consent to be governed.
80
See WALDRON, supra note 2, at 70.
81
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, supra note 53, at 282 (providing an example to show how
Grice’s maxim of relevance may be suspended in particular contexts).
82
This explains why canons of interpretation cannot act as substitutes for an understanding of
legislative context. Miller’s fine article on Grice and canons elaborates the argument for canons, but
does not address the assumption that members are engaged in ordinary speech. Geoffrey P. Miller,
Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179, 1183. At the most crucial
point of legislative compromise, the places we most want to know legislators’ meaning, they are not
likely to be engaged in a cooperative enterprise.
83
One potential meaning absent from this list is “intent as reason.” See BLACKSTONE, supra note
23, at *58–61. In statutory interpretation, a purposivist might argue that intent reflects a reason about a
statute, for example, and that this is what is meant by “intent.” Like motivation or other meanings for
intent, this idea is subject to all of the claims I make here about intent as mental state assuming it is
static, private, and idealized as a mental event. There is no reason not to think of intent as reason, but
to do so is unhelpful in situations of group agents since the implicit analogy to mind causes worries
about whether groups can have internal, private, mental reasons.
84
GILBERT, supra note 52, at 12.
85
BRATMAN, supra note 6, at 110 (“That we do sometimes have intentions that are in an important sense shared seems clear. We commonly report or express such shared intentions by speaking
of what we intend or of what we are going to do or are doing.”). If action reflects intent, then a group
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other’s shoes, or they can simply act to tie each other’s shoes (in the absence of
a joint mental state or a shared agreement). In either case, we can say that they
have the intent to tie shoes. As long as they act to tie each other’s shoes, it does
not matter whether they had a mental picture contemplating such action or an
overt communicative agreement to tie each other’s shoes. Pragmatic intent thus
builds upon but does not negate the possibility of other kinds of intent. Intent
may be envisioned as a state of mind, or it may be envisioned as a feature of
communication, or it may be reflected in action.
In the context of lawmaking, pragmatic intent is particularly important
because plurality defines political action. As Hannah Arendt once emphasized,
political action presumes the viable existence of groups. Political action cannot
“be done in isolation from others—independently of the presence of a plurality
of actors who from their different perspectives can judge the quality of what is
being enacted.” 86 To elicit the consent of others, which sits at the heart of representation, deliberation and persuasive communication, one cannot give
speeches in a closet. As Arendt described it, “plurality is specifically the condition—not only the conditio sine qua non, but the conditio per quam—of all
political life.” 87 For the plurality to reach agreement on political action it must
follow procedures allowing the many, the plurality, to speak in one voice at the
very same time that voice speaks for many.
D. Radin’s Error: Intent as State of Mind
Armed with these ideas of intent, we can return to Radin’s collectivity objection and see that it depends upon assumptions about intent that beg the
question he seeks to answer. 88 Radin wrote that “[t]he chances that of several
hundred men each will have exactly the same determinate situations in mind89
. . . are infinitesimally small.” 90 He posits cases where “the minds of the legislature [are] uniform.” 91 He suggests that a minority’s objection bars collective
of two or more individuals acting in a coordinated manner can be recognized as sharing an intention.
See id.
86
See Setiya, supra note 57.
87
HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7 (2nd ed. 1998).
88
This was how James Landis, in his response, understood Radin’s argument: “To insist that each
individual legislator besides his aye vote must also have expressed the meaning he attaches to the bill
. . . is to disregard the realities of legislative procedure.” Landis, supra note 1, at 888 (emphasis added).
89
Radin, supra note 10, at 870. Here, Radin is identifying what has been called, in constitutional
theory, the “expected applications” view of interpretation. This is different from meaning as it is a
projection of meanings, a set of expectations about how the meaning might be applied, not semantic
content.
90
Id.
91
Id.
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intent. 92 Congress would have an intent if everyone agreed, if they had “exactly the same” intent. 93 In a corollary to this claim, Radin argues that there can
be no group intent because only a few members have the same intent.
Three immediate objections arise. The first is unanimity: no one believes
that collective entities, whether corporations or universities, only act when
everyone shares a unanimous intention or set of factual assumptions.94 Yet Radin wants “exactly the same” intents “in mind,” minds that are “uniform,” several hundred men with “the same . . . situations in mind.” 95 Faculties and corporations and churches make decisions all the time in the face of disagreement.
Moreover, there is nothing in the law that suggests to the contrary. We do not
hold corporations to account only when all members of the organization line
up and sign an affidavit agreeing to the decision. Perhaps more importantly, no
one believes that majoritarian decisions are impossible or illegitimate because
a majority does not include everyone. Indeed, majoritarianism presumes disagreement. 96
The second implausible assumption goes to the static nature of group
agency. The “same intent” objection implies that representatives share the
same intent at the same time. This assumption deserves scrutiny. Faculties,
unions, and churches make decisions over time, not instantaneously. 97 No one
says a corporation or university or labor union has not made a decision because
of the time it takes to make that decision. Perhaps most importantly, we know

92

Id.
Id.
94
The “same intent” problem may not be unique to Radin, as Ekins argues that both John Gardner and Joseph Raz’s theories of minimal or humble intention suffer from this problem. EKINS, supra
note 11, at 114 (“Raz and Gardner . . . [make] the unsound assumption that the legislature’s intention
must be an intention held by each legislator (or each legislator in the majority).”).
95
Radin, supra note 10, at 870.
96
One might argue that some of the organizations I have identified are not necessarily “democratic,” but follow hierarchical norms. In fact, school boards, unions, non-profit organizations, and the
proverbial town hall purport to operate by democratic, majoritarian principles. Even the modern corporation has a form, at least in theory, of shareholder democracy. These organizations operate with
respect to some form of procedure seen as legitimate for that form of organization. Most organizations
include some forms of hierarchy even as they claim resolute democracy; the House of Representatives
and labor unions are examples. See, e.g., WILLIAM PRIDE ET AL., BUSINESS 198 (11th ed. 2011) (“The
pattern of delegation throughout an organization determines the extent to which that organization is
decentralized or centralized.”).
97
Diego Gambetta, “Claro!”: An Essay on Discursive Machismo, in DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 19 (Jon Elster ed., 1998) (providing a contrarian example proving the oddity of the assumption that
intent is instantaneous). Gambetta explains that “Claro!” is “Spanish for ‘Obvious’ ‘I knew it all
along!’ ‘Nothing you say surprises me’—a belittling snap response that greets those who express an
argument, especially if not at all obvious, in countries of that culture.” Id. at 20–21. “In a culture of
this kind . . . agents . . . are unlikely to listen to one another’s arguments, let alone be persuaded by
them.” Id. at 21.
93
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that Congress makes decisions through procedures over time. 98 As Jeremy
Waldron has rightly emphasized, these procedures are Congress’s “constitution.” 99
Finally, Radin makes a seemingly more plausible argument by asserting
that there can be no group agency because only a few members may draft legislation. He writes: a “legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or three men drafted . . . .” 100 Unlike the
earlier two objections, this objection recognizes what appears, at first glance,
to be empirical reality. Participation in legislating tends to be concentrated on a
few who stake their political futures on the difficult course of bill passage. 101
But the “few” who draft a bill cannot pass it. Senators who write for two or
three people, as opposed to 60, 102 are engaged in a fool’s errand. 103 They must
anticipate not only a majority but a supermajority. If drafting be the work of
“the few,” legislating is the work of “the many” (and under supermajoritarism,
the “super-many”).
Ultimately, this claim of the “few” suffers from the same theoretical objection as its cousin, the unanimity argument. If we are prepared to accept the
notion that groups do act, we should also know that they often act through “a
few members.” Ultimately, the claim of “the few”—that a few write the
law 104—goes too far: it applies to all collective action. Corporations and un98
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (providing that each House of Congress may “determine the rules of
its proceedings . . . .”). The House and Senate rules can be easily found online. See RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 112-161 (2013), available at http://clerk.house.gov/
legislative/house-rules.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/98BQ-SSMZ; STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC. NO. 112-1 (2011), available at http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=Rules
OfSenateHome, archived at http://perma.cc/PC3A-RC68 [hereinafter SENATE RULES].
99
WALDRON, supra note 2, at 123.
100
Radin, supra note 10, at 870.
101
RICHARD L. HALL, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESS 3–4 (1996).
102
Almost every bill requires a supermajority in the Senate to pass the cloture barrier. See GREGORY J. WAWRO & ERIC SCHICKLER, FILIBUSTER: OBSTRUCTION AND LAWMAKING IN THE U.S. SENATE 10 (2006) (“The Senate’s rules that protect unlimited debate . . . effectively require supermajorities for the passage of legislation . . . .”); see also 157 CONG. REC. S311 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Harkin) (noting that in the 110th and 111th Congresses, there were 275 filibusters
in just over 4 years. “It has spun out of control. This is not just a cold statistic of 275 filibusters. It
means the filibuster, instead of a rare tool to slow things down, has become an everyday weapon of
obstruction, of veto.”).
103
It is well known that to draft legislation is an act of anticipation of others’ preferences. See R.
DOUGLAS ARNOLD, THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 10 (1990). One must draft to satisfy not
only one’s own constituents, but also other members and their constituents. See id. If the sole representative wants her draft to become law, she must anticipate a tremendous variety of “vetogates”—
hurdles that must be surpassed before a proposed bill becomes law. See William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1443, 1444–47 (2008) (laying out a
vetogates model for lawmaking in the United States and describing nine such vetogates).
104
Note that this partiality critique applies to the text as much as the legislative history. Partiality
is a reason to be skeptical of the entire legislative process, including legislative text: if the few write
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ions and universities delegate decisionmaking to smaller groups to reduce the
transaction costs of decisionmaking. Delegation is considered part of the culture and proper practice of corporate management.105 The few may draft a joint
letter, but those who have authority to act for the many sign it. Thus conceived,
this objection turns out to be a soft form of eliminativism. If the final decision
is the result of less than all, and that fact brands the decision as illegitimate,
then all collective bodies and their actions are potentially illegitimate-becausepartial.
The most important point to see about Radin’s argument, however, is the
idea of “intent” on which it relies—an idea revealing the fundamental weakness of his claims. Radin’s idea of intention is our first modality of intention,
as a static private mental event. He writes of “situations in mind” and “pictures
in mind.” 106 He muses that legislators have “different ideas and beliefs,” specifically equating this with a mental event:
The chances that of several hundred men each will have exactly the
same determinate situations in mind . . . are infinitesimally small.
The chance is still smaller that . . . the litigated issue, will not only
be within the minds of all these men but will be certain to be selected by all of them as the present limit [to which the statute] should be
narrowed. 107
Lest one think Radin not committed to the idea of “intent-as-mentalstate,” consider his argument that, in an extreme case, “it might be that we
could learn all that was in the mind of the draftsman.” 108 Or his argument that
“[e]ven if the contents of the minds of the legislature were uniform, we have
no means of knowing that content except by the external utterances or behavior.” 109
Given this idea of individual intent, Radin must be a group skeptic: if intent lies within the private world of individuals’ minds, then it is impossible to
conclude that groups have intent. Groups do not have minds. This shows, howthe text, then it has no priority, nor legitimacy, as the product of the group, since formal adoption by
the whole rests upon a false sense of legitimacy.
105
Organizational literature takes delegation as a basic part of proper management. ANDREW J.
DUBRIN, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGEMENT 152 (9th ed. 2012) (“A well-planned and highly structured
organization reduces the number of nonprogrammed decisions.”); HAROLD KOONTZ ET AL., ESSENTIALS OF MANAGEMENT 184 (5th ed. 1990) (“Delegation is . . . an elementary act of managing.”); W.
PRIDE ET AL., supra note 96, at 190 (“The third major step in the organizing process is to distribute
power in the organization . . . . The degree of centralization or decentralization of authority is determined by the overall pattern of delegation within the organization.”).
106
Radin, supra note 10, at 870.
107
Id. (emphasis added).
108
Id. (emphasis added).
109
Id. (emphasis added).
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ever, that this particular argument against group agency begs the question, relying upon a contestable assumption about intent. Radin almost admits this
when he states, “[t]hat the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any
real sense is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition.” 110 Assuming an idea of intent by definition incompatible with group
agency, it follows that Radin’s argument cannot be anything but a claim
against group agency writ large.
Radin’s arguments are not substantially improved by the more sophisticated arguments made by Dworkin and others against group intent based on
the speaker’s meaning model. Dworkin argues, like Radin, that collectivity
poses a particularly difficult problem for interpretation. 111 Let us assume that
Dworkin borrows two meanings of intent—intent-as-mental-state112 and intentas-communication between two persons. As Dworkin writes: “So long as we
think legislative intention is a matter of what someone has in mind and means
to communicate by a vote, we must take as primary the mental states of particular people because institutions do not have minds . . . .” 113 In either case we
see the same problems. Even if we imagine that the individual is “communicating,” this does not solve the problem of combining individual minds or
communications. Indeed, Dworkin is at pains to use the “combining minds”
problem to launch his alternative, one asserting the need to construct the best
view of the law as interpretive method.
If this is correct, then the “group intent objection” should be rejected as
question-begging. If you assume at the start that intent reduces to the occurrent
mental state of an individual, then groups cannot have intent by definition since
they do not have minds. Define intent as I (singular) and it cannot be I (group)—
except in the rare case where each and every member has identical occurrent
mental states or, to put it less formally, unless one can show that each person has
the same thought “in his or her head” at the same time. Similar arguments can be
applied even if we change our idea from intent-as-mental-state to intent-as110
111

Id.
DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 335–36. Dworkin states:

So long as we think legislative intention is a matter of what someone has in mind and
means to communicate by a vote, we must take as primary the mental states of particular people because institutions do not have minds, and then we must worry about how to
consolidate individual intentions into a collective, fictitious group intention.
Id.
112
See id. at 336, 337 (arguing that the judge must consider the hopes or expectations or more
detailed political opinions [legislators] have in mind when voting.) Dworkin further notes that the
judge “accepts that he must take more pains to discover the mental attitudes that lie behind legislation
than the mental states of people he meets in pubs . . . . Whose mental states count in fixing the intention behind the Endangered Species Act?”) (emphasis added). Id. at 318.
113
Id. at 335–36 (emphasis added).
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communication. If we assume at the start that intent signals a communication
from one person to another, then we beg the question in favor of individuals
again. Define communication as C (singular) and it cannot be C (group).
E. Group Intent Reconstructed
The typology of intent modalities set forth previously aims to further the
debates about group intention in statutory interpretation, pushing the theory
beyond the conventional arguments, toward greater specificity. In this section,
I move from the critique to a more positive view. I aim to construct a plausible
account of group intent, a project that neither realists nor purposivists have
tackled.
1. The Virtues of Congressional Context
Let us begin with the basic proposition that actions taken within an organization like Congress cannot be understood without understanding their procedural context. To take a simple example, let us say that you want to know the
meaning of the statement—“go to the floor!” One might assume that the
statement means to drop to the floor to do push-ups. But in the congressional
arena, it means something else. If a Senator asks you to “go to the floor” it
means to go to a particular place in the Senate known as “the floor,” or the
Senate chamber. The most devoted advocate of “intent,” must recognize that
context changes meaning.
Legislative context also helps us to understand individual communications from one person to another or “speaker’s meaning.” 114 Consider a statement made by Hubert Humphrey in the debate about the 1964 Civil Rights
Act. At issue was an amendment offered by Senator Tower on the question of
what kinds of tests employers could give employees. Humphrey said: the
“Motorola [decision] 115 was discussed, discussed and cussed.” 116 To the naïve
legal reader, ignorant of the actual context, the statement suggests that Humphrey was trying to communicate his firm opposition to the Motorola decision. In
fact, in the context of the debate, the meaning of the statement and what
Humphrey sought to communicate was quite different. Humphrey was saying

114

Posner, supra note 62, at 817, 818.
In 1964, in Myart v. Motorola, Inc., an Illinois employment board ruled that a general ability
test for applicants for assembly-line jobs was discriminatory. No. 63C-127 (Ill. Fair Employment
Practices Comm’n Feb. 26, 1964), reprinted in 110 CONG. REC. 5662–664 (1964).
116
110 CONG. REC. 13,504 (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (emphasis added).
115
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to his colleagues that Motorola was irrelevant because the issue had already
been addressed in the post-cloture compromise text before the Senate.117
More importantly, congressional context helps us focus on conduct over
time, as decisions change. When views change, they change in the context of a
structure leading to action—a law. Imagine if we were to freeze-frame the
views of Senators on civil rights in 1964. Many Senators views about race, ex
ante, would appear quite rigidly racist. Now, fast forward to the “longest debate in history” on the Civil Rights Act. 118 As the debate went on, legislators
changed their views. And they changed their views not because their beliefs
about race changed, but because their views about the wisdom of voting for the
bill—action in congressional context—changed.
2. Constructing a Theory of Group Intent
If congressional context is helpful with respect to all the previously discussed intent modalities, it has the added virtue of helping us construct a plausible vision of group intent. Congress has the functional equivalent of intent
and that equivalent lies in its sequential procedures. These procedures are how
a group plans for the future. To get some intuition for this, we must first rid
ourselves of the notion that intent is inevitably located in a mind or “embodied.” Sometimes when we talk of intent, it seems almost impossible not to believe in a physical mind. That a group is not individually “embodied” does not
logically bar the functional equivalent of the embodied. So, for example, a
wheelchair is not made of biological material, but it enables bodily movement.
So too, here, group procedures are not embodied, but they are the functional
equivalent of what is generally seen as embodied in mind. Just as the wheelchair allows an individual to move, so too a group’s procedures allow it to plan
for the future as a group and, in this sense, have group intent. 119
The pragmatic modality of intent, by focusing on communicative context,
allows for “we-intentions” that are more than the sum of individual mental
states or communications. These intentions may be shared consciously or not,
with or without overt communication between the parties. For example, sup117

See Nourse, supra note 4, at 114–18 (further explaining this debate). By using this example, I
do not mean to suggest that Humphrey’s statement alone is enough. It acquires group status because it
is made by the manager of the bill and, further, because it explains the procedural context of the
amendment.
118
See generally CHARLES W. WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (1985).
119
To borrow another disembodied metaphor, consider a computer programmed to spit out legislation, a metaphor used by Jeremy Waldron to reject the notion of group intent. See WALDRON, supra
note 2, at 131–33 (discussing the Wollheim machine). In my view, the program for that computer
operates just like congressional procedure. In this sense, the computer metaphor supports—rather than
undermines—claims for the functional equivalent of group intent.
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pose that a group of Senators file a cloture petition. 120 Those Senators have
signed their name to a document, acting to close debate. From this action, we
can infer that the members share a “we-intention.” This does not require that
Senators communicate with each other or that we know anything about what is
inside their heads; they may simply sign without discussion. Nor does it suggest that the signatories have precisely similar “we want cloture” mental pictures in their heads. Signing may be a thoughtless act. But if the members act
in parallel, whether by painting a house 121 or signing a document, even without
a mental event or communication, we can infer that they had the we-intention
to do the act.
In the legislative context, this is important for two reasons. Principles of
congressional action are “we-intentions” in the pragmatic sense of the term
“intention.” Members act based on rules and procedures. Let me be clear that
this does not require that all members agree to those procedures, have mental
states agreeing to those procedures, have communicated about the procedures,
or have even read the procedures. All they have to do as a group is act according to the procedures. If the group shows by its actions a “we-intention” to
abide by congressional process, that is enough for the pragmatic modality of
intent. Lest this confuse (as “intent” almost immediately forces us into thinking of mental states) there are easy examples of similar coordinated action.
Chess players who simply sit down to play the game without a word are operating based on a “we-intention” to jointly play the game in the pragmatic modality of intent. 122
The “we-intention” of congressional procedure 123 can be conceived as a
“meta-intention” in the following sense. It is a “we-intention” to provide a

120
The cloture rule permits sixty percent of the Senate to “vote to end a filibuster on any debatable motion.” Michael J. Teter, Equality Among Equals: Is the Senate Cloture Rule Unconstitutional?,
94 MARQ. L. REV. 547, 551 (2010); see SENATE RULES, supra note 98, R. XXII, at 20–21 (providing
for the closing of debate after a cloture motion).
121
Michael E. Bratman, Shared Cooperative Activity, 101 PHIL. REV. 327, 331–32 (1992).
122
See id. at 340 (“A joint activity can be cooperative down to a certain level and yet competitive
beyond that . . . . [In playing chess,] [y]ou and I do not intend that our subplans mesh all the way
down. But you and I do intend that our subplans mesh down to the level of the relevant rules and practices. Our chess playing . . . is jointly intentional, and it involves shared cooperation down to the cited
level.”).
123
No one should misconstrue this as the claim that Congress only has group intent with respect
to its procedures. Consider an example from chess. No one says that the game cannot have taken
place, or that any move is not the playing of chess, because individuals sat at the board. Simply because they are playing by the rules of the game, we can infer a shared intent to play the game, and
conclude that each game and each move is conducted pursuant to the rules is a legitimate action of a
group activity conducted with the group intent to “play chess.” Lest this not convince, consider the
actions of corporations pursuant to rules. We can say that action following the corporation’s procedures to issue 10K reports is a group action and reflects group intent to issue the 10K. We do not dis-
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framework for individual we-intentions in the future. 124 A pragmatic weintention 125 with respect to congressional procedure governs processes for every statute. For example, acting pursuant to congressional procedure reflects a
pragmatic “we-intent” that if a majority votes for the statute, that vote prevails
for every member in the group—no matter what their mental state or what they
have communicated about the bill. Those who oppose the statute share a pragmatic we-intent with those who favor the statute to act as a group “we” as far
as the resulting legislation. And, why is this? Because, as even group intent
skeptics like Ken Shepsle 126 understand, if there is any core to a group, it is the
organization and procedures governing that group.
Group agency of any entity, whether it is a church, a corporation, or a
university, depends upon procedures to plan future action. Acting pursuant to
congressional procedure reflects a group intent to allow any particular piece of
legislation to constitute the act of the group. Think of the rule as a signpost
saying: “any act that follows according to these procedures is now stamped as
legitimate group action.” This applies to all steps within congressional process
legitimated by the rules. There is nothing terribly exotic about this: when we
agree to abide by a Supreme Court decision or an election, even if we disagree
with the outcome, we do so because we have made a commitment to procedures we believe are legitimate.
To summarize: as we saw earlier, the problem with the group intent objection is that it imagines intent as the mental state of an individual. Intent does
not require a mental state, nor need it be limited to individuals. Intent may be
inferred from action. Group intent may be inferred from group action. Group
action happens because of sequential procedures. This is how the group plans
for the future. If this is correct, then when one looks for “congressional intent,”
one is not looking for any special mental state behind text or action—whether
of individuals or groups. Instead, one is looking for crucial context for interpreting group action. Put in other words, one is looking for the public meaning
of public acts done according to the rules. Congress has no mind, but it has the
functional equivalent of intent—a way to plan for the future. And that “way” is
essential context for understanding its actions.
miss this action because there were individuals involved or because the individuals had minds or because individuals talked to each other creating the report.
124
Special thanks to David Luban for clarifying this distinction.
125
Nothing in my claim about a “we-intention” to act pursuant to the rules requires that there be a
we-intent on any particular statute, whereby intent one means shared mental states or statements or
even votes.
126
Compare Shepsle, supra note 48, at 254 (arguing against the notion of legislative intent), with
KENNETH A. SHEPSLE, ANALYZING POLITICS: RATIONALITY, BEHAVIOR, AND INSTITUTIONS 374 (2d
ed. 2010) (arguing that “[p]rocedures are required to cut through all this instability,” given that “there
is no equilibrium to majority voting”).
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F. Group Agency, Sequential Procedure, and Feedback
Lest one remain skeptical, it is important to see how recent work on
“group agency” parallels my claims about group intention. The philosopher,
Philip Pettit, and political economist, Christian List, have recently modeled
what they call “group agency” in an attempt to put to rest sophisticated claims
made by political economists that groups can never act rationally under the
Arrovian cycling thesis. 127 Although that thesis is beyond the purview of this
paper, List & Pettit’s arguments provide substantial analytic support for rejecting the “group intent objection.” Even if one rejects my version of group intent, at the very least, their arguments suggest that the skeptical “cash value” of
group intent skepticism—that groups cannot act—should be rejected.
List and Pettit argue that group decisions emerge as a result of sequential
processes involving feedback. 128 As they explain, “a group’s performance as
an agent depends on how it is organized: its rules and procedures for forming
its propositional attitudes . . . and for putting them into action.” 129 Procedures
allow decisions that do not correspond to the intentions of any particular member but may nevertheless be said to constitute group agency. Feedback allows
individuals to shift from their original preferences to ones that they “judge . . .
better, for the group to accept.” 130 To embrace this account of group agency, it
is important to recognize what the theory does not entail. It does not entail
some spectral intent hovering above the group. Pettit and List reject this view
of the “group-mind” as a failed legacy of an “emergentist” tradition in which
group-think emerges in mysterious fashion.
List and Pettit are also quick to explain that their model does not eliminate individuals. The formal model uses the concept of supervenience 131 to
describe the relationship of individuals to groups. Imagine that we have datapoints arrayed on a graph based on particular numerical positions (3 on the
horizontal axis, 4 on the vertical axis). Now we add another one hundred data127
LIST & PETTIT, supra note 51, at 58. Their argument is aimed at addressing the problems of
incoherency suggested by positive political theory and Kenneth Arrow’s theorem. That part of their
analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
128
See id. at 63.
129
Id. at 81.
130
Id. at 63.
131
List and Pettit explain supervenience as follows:

Think of the relation between the shapes made by dots on a grid and the positions or
coordinates of the dots . . . . Nothing causal needs to happen in order for the positions to
give rise to the shapes; suitably positioned, the dots simply constitute the shapes . . . .
Fix the number and positions of the dots and, as a matter of logical necessity, the shapes
will be fixed as well.
Id. at 65.
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points, placing them on the graph based on given coordinates (5/6; 10/3; 4/2
etc.). By the time we are done, we see that the datapoints create a square shape.
The square shape is the group attitude; it is more than the individual datapoints, but it does not eradicate those individual datapoints. The bottom line:
one does not have to give up methodological individualism, or posit a “group
mind,” to believe that it is possible for a group to act in ways that no individual
member prefers ex ante or even ex post.
Although List and Pettit make a variety of arguments about group agency,
for my purposes, the central conceptual innovation is that sequential procedures are points of preference, aggregation, and revision. 132 In this, List and
Pettit reject the caricatured assumption that “preferences are fixed.”133 In fact,
as economists have known for several decades, preferences do change and they
should change with new information, under basic theories of rationality. They
also change because new reasons arise about alternative courses of action, including new procedural reasons. 134 Put in other words, rules and procedures
may force endogenous preference-shifting. In this sense, there are no stable
exogenous preferences. As long as preferences cannot yield a result without
proceeding through a gauntlet of rules, preferences will shift as a result of
those rules or, if not, they will yield no result at all.
List and Pettit’s insights on group agency are more than theoretical—they
are also realistic. It is a fact that Congress works through sequential procedures. 135 One would need no such rules if members could simply sit down and
determine, on a moment’s notice, how they would vote. 136 That, after all, is the
132

See id. at 63.
Franz Dietrich & Christian List, Where Do Preferences Come From?, 42 INT’L J. GAME THEORY 613, 614 (2013).
134
Economists have been grappling with this for some time and concede that preferences can
change with new information as in Bayesian analysis, where initial probabilities are changed on the
basis of new information. See LIST & PETTIT, supra note 51, at 12–13, 16. Dietrich and List argue that
differing alternatives can change one’s preferences, even if there is no new information. Dietrich &
List, supra note 133, at 613. One need not accept that account to accept the relevance of sequential
procedures asserted here, as these procedures are means to provide new information (information
about the voting preferences of other members).
135
See generally SINCLAIR, supra note 19 (discussing the legislative process in the House of
Representatives and the legislative process in the U. S. Senate).
136
I am not arguing against the relative stability of members’ preferences. See, e.g., Keith T.
Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Patterns of Congressional Voting, 35 AM. J. POL. SCI. 228, 228 (1991).
Aggregate data prove the obvious truth that members try to vote consistently on issues—no one wants
to be a “flip-flopper” at election time. See id. at 261. However, at the margin, on first votes, non-roll
call votes, important procedural motions (i.e. cloture), or on votes for which there is no clear precedent or effect, members have considerable leeway to form their preferences. Political pressure and
social change may as well yield “evolution” of members’ views on controversial issues. For example,
consider recent transformations on the question of gay marriage by various politicians. See Sen. Nelson Endorses Same-Sex Marriage, CNN: POLITICAL TICKER (Apr. 4, 2013 5:57 PM), http://
politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/04/04/sen-nelson-endorses-same-sex-marriage/, archived at http://
133
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claim made by those who accept a static, internal, notion of intent. In fact, legislation is always beset by the vagaries of time and uncertainty. Ex ante, members often do not know the preferences of other members or even their own
constituents. That uncertainty is managed by procedural means: procedures
force members to reveal their preferences. With new information about preferences, other members in turn may change their preferred positions.
To pass legislation, members must obtain the support of others—at least a
majority if not a supermajority. Procedures allow for feedback as to how others
will vote on a proposal or what bill changes are necessary to secure a member’s vote. So, for example, let us say the chairman of a committee proposes a
bill. That bill is then heard in committee. At the markup, changes are made.
The new bill may no longer reflect the preference of any single committee
member, but does reflect the shared preference to move the legislation to the
floor for debate. If the bill ultimately passes, it may not reflect the individual
or additive preferences of individual members. This should not cause dismay
because it is inherent in the process of aggregation and persuasion.
To bring this down to earth, consider the Civil Rights Act of 1964.137 Prior
to bill debate, members’ preferences were likely to have been all over the board.
Some would rather have had no bill (it was a long and fierce filibuster).138 Some
wanted a stronger bill. But once faced with the likelihood that the filibuster
would fail, and the possibility of electoral consequences once the bill passed,139
some members’ preferences changed. Members who ex ante preferred no bill
changed their preference to vote for cloture.140
This example illustrates how procedural processes create occasions for
testing preference aggregations reached by subordinate bodies. When the Senate debates a bill, 141 before cloture is achieved, a compromise bill will be “sub-

perma.cc/DN63-4HS6 (“Florida Sen. Bill Nelson . . . joined a wave of Democratic senators announcing their support for same sex marriage, reversing his position . . . .”); Michael Falcone & Z. Byron
Wolf, Republican Rob Portman Supports Gay Marriage, ABC NEWS, Mar. 15, 2013, http://
abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/republican-rob-portman-supports-gay-marriage/story?id=18736731,
archived at http://perma.cc/969J-GZ2V (“U.S. Sen. Rob Portman, R-Ohio, once on the short-list to be
Mitt Romney's 2012 running mate, has reversed his opposition to gay marriage . . . .”).
137
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 28 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)).
138
Landmark Legislation: The Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/
artandhistory/history/common/generic/CivilRightsAc-t1964.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/CP4QN27C.
139
See SINCLAIR, supra note 19, at 19–21. This example reveals what is implicit in the examples
given in this Part: perceived electoral pressure (a bill whose “time” has come) is an important and
often dominant force motivating individuals to shift preferences. See id.
140
See id.
141
In the House, the Rules Committee, which issues the rules for debate on any bill, can secondguess committees’ judgments and offer the opportunity for amendments. See id. at 36–44.

1644

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 55:1613

stituted” for the committee bill.142 For example, in the case of the 1964 Civil
Rights bill, the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute was offered. 143 That bill included
a number of compromises tempering the law’s impact on business. 144 As the
bill moved through the process, procedural rules allowed for what Pettit and
List describe as preference aggregation and transformation. Ex ante the final
bill may not represent the wishes of any member, but because of this internal
dynamic, it comes to represent the act of the whole.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY RECONSIDERED
The idea that a group could have the functional equivalent of intent will
not satisfy those on either side of the great debates about legislative history. 145
Textualists claim one should never look at legislative history; purposivists
think all legislative history just fine. I reject both positions. I argue that textualists must refer to some forms of legislative history, particularly statutory history, to find the proper text. Furthermore, I argue that purposivists need to develop far more discipline in searching for legislative context. Both textualists and
purposivists must distinguish between legislative history as statutory history,
legislative history as a record of usage, and legislative history as a record of
Congress’s decisionmaking process (statutes as elections). Put in other words,
both sides must begin to have a much more sophisticated theory of legislative
context. Section A of this Part begins by considering whether puposivists are
able to identify the relevant legislative history. In Section B, I consider textualists’ ability to identify the right text. In Section C, I discuss legislative history
and group attribution.
A. Can Purposivists Identify the Right Legislative History?
Despite the widely received notion that legislative history is a self-evident
concept, it is important to make several distinctions, most importantly between
statutory history (the history of the text of the statute) and legislative history
writ large (the deliberative context). As we will also see, there are different
ways of using legislative history—as indicia of semantic “usage” or to determine “purpose.” In this Section, I argue that legislative history-as-history
should be reconceived. Statutes are not made in narrative form, but oscillating
political battle. Searching for legislative context should target disputed mean142

Id. at 50, 53–56, 72–85.
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., CASES ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION
OF PUBLIC POLICY at 19–20 (3d ed. 2001).
144
Id. at 19.
145
Some will make constitutional arguments, which are addressed elsewhere. Victoria Nourse,
Legislative History and the Constitution (forthcoming U. Pa. Const. L. Rev. 2014).
143
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ings with the least effort for the most illumination, with due attention to congress’s procedures and most importantly to the question of who won or lost the
debate. Certainly, it should not be the object of any discussion of legislative
history to capture the will of a concerted filibustering minority.
1. Statutory History and the Multiple Purpose Problem
Purposivists have purportedly never seen legislative history that they did
not like. They typically argue that legislative history should be used to find
purposes. There are three significant problems with this effort. First, just as
one can pick and choose texts, it is easy to pick and choose purposes. Indeed, it
is obviously easier to pick and choose purposes since legislative history is almost by definition more voluminous than the text of the statute. Second, in any
important debate, cross-purposes proliferate, which is to say multiple purposes
may cancel each other. Third, and perhaps more importantly, purposivism often assumes that Congress has not made a decision about specific texts when,
in fact, it may well have done just that or, at the very least, confined the inquiry
far more substantially than would an inquiry into purpose alone. Put in other
words, purposivism has the capability of making relatively easy cases more
difficult.
We can see this best with an example. In 1989, in Public Citizen v. U.S.
Department of Justice (“the ABA case”) the U. S. Supreme Court considered
whether the American Bar Association’s committees recommending judicial
nominees were required to comply with the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA), a sunshine law. 146 The law was triggered when the President “established” or “utilized” any committee of two or more persons. 147 The President
had obviously not “established” the American Bar Association but, on the other hand, he did appear to have “utilized” their advice on judicial nominations. 148 Justice William J. Brennan asked whether Congress could possibly
have had the “purpose” to cover a vast range of private entities, such as the
NAACP or the American Legion, when these organizations provided advice to
the President. 149 Ultimately, the majority opinion, in an act of apparent judicial
surgery, concluded that the term “utilize” did not really mean “utilize,” but
something more like “establish.” 150
Justice Brennan’s invocation of purpose does not solve the multiple purpose problem. One cannot conclude, as the opinion suggests, that the only pur146

Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 443 (1989).
Id. at 452.
148
Id.
149
Id. at 452, 453.
150
Id. at 463–64
147
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pose of the statute was to exclude preexisting private entities. In fact, Congress
might have wanted precisely the opposite result—albeit in some cases. Government contractors, for example, were excluded. But if oil and gas companies
were on a committee advising the EPA on greenhouse gases, Congress wanted
FACA to apply. In fact, committee reports cited the quasi-private National
Academy of Sciences and its private advisors as an example of a “covered”
entity. 151 In short, the purposivist analysis here is subject to the multiple purpose critique.
Statutory history could have avoided this problem. Rather than looking
for purpose in a voluminous record, one looks for how the pesky, seemingly
absurd, term “utilize” appeared in the statute. One finds that both houses
passed language covering committees “established” by the government, and
that “utilize” was never passed by either house, but first appeared in conference committee. 152 That decisional path gives important context to the meaning of the term. Under the rules, committees cannot change text that has been
agreed to by the House and Senate (in this case “established”). 153 In the absence of objection, on the grounds that this rule has been violated, members
are entitled to assume that conference changes are not significant. 154 Taking
this statutory history approach, one can say that the Court should not interpret
the term “utilize” to mean anything significantly different from “establish.”
One can reach this result without weighing multiple purposes, or a lengthy holistic recitation of the history of the FACA; 155 it can be reached by tracing statutory text. For purposivists, however, it has never seemed necessary to trace
the process, as well as the purpose, of statutes.
2. False Assumptions About Congressional Lack of Foresight
One of purposivism’s standard assumptions is that Congress is unlikely to
have decided the specific question before the court because of foreseeability
(the legislature could not imagine every consequence). But this is an assumption, not a necessary truth. Textualists suggest an analogous assumption. They
urge that purposivism tends to expand the domain of statutes, by moving the
inquiry up a level of generality, replacing a specific text with a more general
purpose. 156 The implicit assumption is that any recourse to legislative history
151

Id. at 460 n.11 (citing H. R. REP. NO. 91-1731, at 15 (1970)).
For further discussion, see generally Nourse, supra note 4.
153
CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A REFERENCE, RESEARCH,
AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 812–13 (1989) (“Conferees cannot remove language both chambers agree
on, or insert new provisions not in either chamber’s version.”).
154
See Nourse, supra note 4, at 93–98.
155
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 455–65.
156
Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 552 (1983).
152
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will be more general than the text of the statute. 157 However well worn these
claims, they are based on a falsifiable empirical assumption—that Congress
did not address the specific question. There is no reason to think that this is
always the case.
Consider the canonical case, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
decided in 1892 by the U.S. Supreme Court. 158 Professor Vermeule has written
the classic argument supporting Justice Scalia’s interpretation, claiming that
the legislative history shows members knew that the statutory terms—“labor or
service of any kind” covered all kinds of labor including “brain toilers.”159 Professor Chomsky has written an equally lengthy reply arguing to the contrary
and emphasizing the legislative history as a source of a much narrower purpose excluding the minister. 160 However, neither asked whether the legislative
history had anything specific to say about ministers or religion. In fact, there is
legislative history that comes close: Senator Morgan explained that “[p]eople
who can instruct us in morals and religion and in every species of elevation by
lectures . . . are not prohibited.” 161 This example shows that if one is focused
on purpose, at a high level of generality, one may well miss this legislative history. 162 Of course, if one never looks at legislative materials, or if one is look-

157
Radin, supra note 10, at 871 (“Interpretation is an act which requires an existing determinate
event—the issue to be litigated—and obviously that determine event can not exist until after the statute has come into force.”).
158
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458 (1892). In Holy Trinity, the
Court considered whether a federal law prohibiting a U.S. employer from contracting foreign laborers
applied to a church that contracted with a pastor in England. See id. Professor Chomsky has written
the classic law review article focused on the purpose of the Act to cover the mass importation of slave
labor. See generally Carol Chomsky, Unlocking the Mysteries of Holy Trinity: Spirit, Letter, and
History in Statutory Interpretation, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 901 (2000) (focusing on the idea that the law
at issue in Holy Trinity was designed to cover mass importation of slave labor).
159
Vermeule, supra note 22, at 1835, 1852.
160
See generally Chomsky, supra note 159.
161
16 CONG. REC. 1633 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1885) (statement of Rep. Morgan) (emphasis added).
Morgan opposed the bill but supported the lecturer amendment. Id. For a lengthier discussion of this
case, see Nourse, supra note 4, at 118–28. In my opinion, this single statement does not resolve the
case, but it does suggest that the semantic meaning of “lecturer” could well include a “minister.” See
16 CONG. REC. 1633 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1885) (statement of Rep. Morgan).
162
The only academic to have noted the lecturer exemption at the outset of the debate was Professor Tribe who focused on the constitutionality of the statute and thus had no reason to peruse the legislative history. Laurence H. Tribe, Comment, in SCALIA, supra note 5, at 92.
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ing for something a good deal more general, 163 then one may miss the more
specific lecturer text and its explication entirely. 164
3. Statutes as Elections, Not Stories
There are significant dangers to roaming around legislative history with
no appreciation for congressional procedure. Purposivists, for example, seem
to be willing to find “purpose” anywhere and without regard to time. So, for
example, although early committee reports may well be irrelevant by the time
of final language on large bills, this seems to be no barrier to their citation. 165
So, too, purposivists seem to be willing to look for statutory evidence of purpose based on all sorts of evidence that Congress may or may not have had
before it—regulations, advisory committee reports etc. One might of course
justify this on the ground that purposivists are trying to make the law as a
whole “coherent.” But this does not explain for example, why no purposivist
has ever argued that one should not cite those who opposed the bill, even a
filibustering minority. 166
Purposivism’s permissive everything-is-ok approach toward legislative
history can quickly get the interpreter in trouble. It is likely to lead to the familiar charge of “picking one’s friends,” and there are far more friends to pick
in legislative history than in statutory language. It is also likely to lead to “representative” dangers, where by “representative” I mean that purposivists’ lack
of discipline can lead them to expend extra effort to impose on a statute a
meaning that members, based on bill text, would not have had. Consider the
lengthy legislative history discussion written by Justice John Paul Stevens in
the 1989 U.S. Supreme Court decision Green v. Bock Laundry Machine. 167
There, Justice Stevens provides an erudite lecture on the origins of the eviden163

So, for example, in Holy Trinity, if one determined that “lecturer” was the relevant text, then
one would look to the most relevant and specific legislative context—discussions of the lecturer exemption. Senator Morgan’s remark on “lecturers on religion” does not slam the door shut. After all, it
is the statement of a single Senator and he might have referred to itinerant speakers on the Chatauqua
circuit, not behind a pulpit. The point is simply that the legislative history makes clear that members
took the lecturer exemption seriously.
164
To suggest that there are cases in which purpose may bias the legislative history inquiry is not
to argue that purposivism as a theory of statutory construction is wrong. We are all purposivists now:
even Justice Scalia has embraced purposivism as long as it is based on the text of the statute. It is to
say that roaming around legislative history looking for purposes should be reserved for cases when all
other approaches are exhausted.
165
For an example of this phenomenon, see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 230–52
(1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing congressional debates that occurred before introduction of
the crucial statutory provision at issue in the case, as well as minority reports); see also infra notes
173–175 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of Weber).
166
Nourse, supra note 4, at 114–18.
167
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 514–24 (1989).
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tiary doctrine governing the admission of a witness’s prior felony convictions. 168 After a lengthy survey of non-legislative materials, including legal
treatises and American Law Institute proposals,169 he ultimately concludes that
the Congress decided to apply something close to the common law rule, allowing the admission of prior-crimes evidence. A strong “pro-common law” purpose, nevertheless, is hard to square with the back and forth textual changes
that actually occurred in Congress. The Senate passed the common law rule.
The House passed a wildly different rule contrary to the common law. The
Houses went to conference and they changed the rule to adopt neither the
House or the Senate version. Given this back and forth, it is hard to see a coherent purpose to adopt the common law. As this shows, the building of text is
not necessarily a coherent process, but a debate which oscillates, as Congress
decides, redecides, and then compromises.
Traditional ways of doing legislative history can lead to fantasy narratives, imposing coherence on a tale never meant to be coherent. In the famous
affirmative action case, United Steelworkers v. Weber, decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1979, Justice William Rehnquist described legislative history
in a lengthy dissent. 170 Like Justice Stevens in Bock Laundry, Justice
Rehnquist writes a history devoid of understanding basic principles of congressional process. First, the opinion ignores statutory history, which certainly
has a better pedigree than roaming the record. The most important and specific
statutory provision on affirmative action was section 703(j) which was added
in the Senate prior to cloture—that provision specifically provided that no
company would be “required” to impose affirmative action.171 Not only did the
opinion ignore the preeminence of a later, qualifying and more specific text, it
also cited a vast amount of legislative history that could not possibly have had
anything to do with section 703(j). For example, the Rehnquist dissent cited
debates on the House floor, in committees in the House, and early Senate debates before cloture. 172 What is worse, the opinion even cited a minority report:
surely filibustering minorities should not determine the meaning of a bill. Stat-

168

See id.
Id. at 511–14.
170
Weber, 443 U.S. at 230–52 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
171
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2006) (“Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer, employment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group.”).
Cloture was voted on June 10, 1964. See 110 CONG. REC. 13,327 (1964). Section 703(j) is reprinted in
the precloture bill at 110 CONG. REC. 13,315 (1964). See Nourse, supra note 4, at 106–08 (discussing
the relevant history of the bill).
172
See Nourse, supra note 4, at 106–08 (discussing this aspect of Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in
Weber).
169
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utes are elections: some views win and some lose. To the extent that statutes
have coherence, it is the coherence of votes, not of stories.
Purposivists have assumed, without question, that legislative histories
should be narratives. But this assumes that the making of a statute is a narrative process—that it is possible to tell a coherent tale, rather than one in which
zigzagging and contradiction prevail. As students of narrative 173 know, the secret and perverse logic of narrative operates in reverse. Narrative is created by
“a discoverer standing at the end of the process, then laid out as a plot leading
from beginning to discovery. Earlier events or actions make sense only as their
meaning becomes clear through subsequent events.”174 The same is true of legislative history and congressional process. Imposing a narrative is in fact far
harder than zeroing in on the key amendment or a change in bill text. Imposing
a story line on an electoral give and take can prove a time-consuming exercise
in judicial imagination. Purposivists have made their work much harder than it
has to be by failing to distinguish statutory history from legislative history, and
from failing to understand how legislative history is made. In the process, they
have inadvertently invited the textualist reply that they seek to find justification for a result in legislative history, rather than engage in a principled search
for contextual meaning.
B. Can Textualists Identify the Right Text?
Textualists concede that there is no way to understand the meaning of a
term without context. 175 They urge that they are not literalists, but understand
the basic modern findings of linguistics that meaning is inherently contextual. 176 They avidly consult particular kinds of context, such as canons or dictionaries as evidence of semantic meaning. The question becomes, of course,
why procedural context should not count as important context and why it
173
The “logic of narrative” is one of reverse engineering, “the determination of means by ends.”
Peter Brooks, Law and Humanities: Two Attempts, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1437, 1458 (2013) (quoting Gérard Genette, Likelihood and Motivation, in FIGURES II, at 94 (1969) (the work of a literary theorist)).
174
Id.
175
BRYAN GARNER & ANTONIN SCALIA, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 33 (2012) (arguing that the context embraces textual purpose, historical usage, and syntactic
setting). Garner and Scalia write, “[t]he principle of semantic content of words is limited to permissible meanings . . . . But some do not accept it: They seek to arrive at legal meanings through some
method other than discerning the contextual meaning of words and sentences and paragraphs.” See id.
176
“Modern textualists start from the premise that ‘a large number of contextual understandings
will be assumed by all speakers of a language,’ and that many such understandings will be ‘largely
invariant across English speakers at a given time.’” Manning, supra note 10, at 2458. “In contrast with
the plain meaning school’s emphasis on literal meaning, modern textualism screens out many absurdities at the threshold by accounting for the contextual nuances of language, especially the particular
nuances and conventions that the subcommunity of legal speakers has developed to facilitate effective
legal communication.” Id.

2014]

Rethinking Legistlative Intent & History

1651

should not take priority if the textualist aims to be a faithful agent of Congress
rather than Blackstone or Webster. Put in other words, why ignore Congress’s
rule context, when even the constitution supports the creation of those rules by
each house of Congress? 177
Textualists have not articulated a rationale, however, about why some
context matters rather than others. Why do dictionaries and canons count?
Why not legislative context? More importantly, why are dictionaries and canons more faithful expressions of Congress’s meaning? We know, from recent
empirical studies, that drafters tend not to know canons. 178 We also know that
canons have no specific constitutional sanction, as do Congress’s rules.179 If
textualism is all about rules (as some have contended), then why not Congress’s rules? At the very least, textualists should concede that the all-ornothing position is untenable, based on the very principles they hold dear—
respect for text, semantic meaning, and judicial restraint.
1. Entextualization: Choosing the Right Text
To find the meaning of language one must identify the key text. Lawyers
learn to identify and pull chunks of text out of a larger statute. Linguists call
this process “entextualization,” which means that some language is identified
as “the” relevant language. So, in Holy Trinity, the Court focused on the terms
“labor or service of any kind.” 180 This process of “entextualization” is an identifiable step in the process of attributing meaning—even if it has been almost
entirely ignored by statutory interpreters.181 If the text “entextualized” is wrong
or incomplete, so too will be the interpretation.
Hundreds of pages, quite literally, have been written about Holy Trinity,182
a case Justice Scalia made the poster child for new textualism. In his deservedly famous Tanner lectures, 183 he concluded that although the result might seem
odd—using an anti-slave labor statute to cover a British minister—the statute
did in fact cover the rector. The statute said “labor” of any kind, and that in177

See U. S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (granting authority to the individual houses of Congress to set their
own rules of proceeding).
178
Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside–An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 902
(2013).
179
Cf. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 5.
180
143 U.S. at 458.
181
Entextualization appears to be a move that takes a term—such as labor or lecturer—out of
context. The text appears, once isolated, to have no context, having been isolated as an autonomous
object for legal analysis. However, isolating text is a process by which the text is in fact “recontexualized” within the judicial process, according to judicial values. See id.
182
See supra notes 158–164 and accompanying text.
183
SCALIA, supra note 5, at 18–23.
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cluded brain toilers. That argument assumes that there is one relevant text. Focusing on the term “labor” is a choice, and a significant one. As this and other
cases show, the first frame by which one analyzes a case may not be the best or
only one. In fact, there is another relevant text—the statutory exemption for
“lecturers”—a text that appears to cut precisely in the opposite direction, excluding the good rector. There is no immediate reason based on the semantic
content of “lecturer” 184 to believe that ministers do not count as “lecturers.”
One who lectures (who orates at a lectern in front of groups of people) includes a minister. 185
Textualism requires a theory of which text to pick—a theory of entextualization. If one does not see that “lecturer” may be relevant, then presumably
one has made the case plain by fiat, not fact. Statutory history can provide a
check against errors at the entextualization stage—relying upon the wrong, or
a partial, text. If statutory history were analyzed, one would compare the bill as
introduced and passed by the House, the bill as introduced and passed by the
Senate, and the final text. When comparing these bills (which computers can
do rather easily these days), there is a far greater chance that one will note textual changes and thus differences. In Holy Trinity, for example, a comparison
of statutory text helps the reader focus on the lecturer exemption.
2. Not All Text Is Alike: (or, at least Congress’s rules say that).
To see why interpreters should analyze statutory history, it is important to
remember that Congress’s rules give greater weight to some texts as opposed
to others . . . . 186 Consider the ABA case again. 187 If one had started with statutory history, one could easily have avoided the Justices’ conclusion that the
statute was absurd. 188 Statutory history reveals that both houses had passed the
term “establish” (leaving the ABA out), but the conference committee added
the term “utilize” (potentially covering the ABA). If a conference committee
adds language that significantly changes the bill, it violates House and Senate
184

Note that in urging a broad interpretation for “labor,” textualists are using a semantically extensive meaning of the term, and presumably that same type of meaning should be applied to other
terms in the statute. An extensive meaning for the term “lecturer” would include any person who
could lecture, therefore excluding the rector. “Labor” could, by contrast, be interpreted to mean a
prototypical laborer, or manual laborer. See generally Nourse, supra note 4, at 124–25 (illustrating the
difference between prototypical and extensive meanings).
185
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
186
See H.R. DOC. NO. 112-161. Text added in conference committee, as this example shows, is
viewed under the rules differently from other text. Members assume that the committee has followed
its rules not to make significant changes in texts that are already agreed upon. Put in other words, if
both houses pass text, that text takes priority in the committee and on the floor.
187
Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 440.
188
See id.
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rules. 189 Under those rules, members of congress are entitled to interpret “conference committee” text as the equivalent of “no significant change,” in the
absence of a floor objection. No one in Congress wants a committee rewriting
the bill, trumping the will of 535 members. Indeed, a court that gives “utilize”
the same weight as “establish” in this case does precisely what textualists often
claim that they want to avoid—it gives authority to language that only a part
of Congress wrote.
Statutory history—tracing the path of the law’s language—is also likely
to reveal conflicts in text that faulty entextualization decisions obscure. Consider Bock Laundry, in which the U.S. Supreme Court considered whether an
evidentiary rule applied to a plaintiff if the statute said “defendant.” 190 No one
thought the statute made any sense, including Justice Scalia, but everyone focused on a single term “defendant.” As in the ABA case, the pesky, seemingly
absurd term in Bock Laundry, appeared in conference. Perhaps more importantly, in reviewing the statutory history, one finds that there were other
terms potentially relevant to the question whether the evidentiary rule at issue
applied to civil cases. Both houses passed language that appeared to cover civil
and criminal cases, as is standard in evidentiary rules, by covering all witnesses. 191 The term “witness” was never discussed as part of the Supreme Court’s
statutory analysis, even though it seems to exclude an interpretation that the
rule applies only in criminal cases. Instead, the Justices focused on a single
term—defendant—the one added in conference—the term with the least legitimacy from textualists’ own perspective. 192
3. Juriscentric Cognitive Bias
The third problem at the entextualization stage is cognitive bias in determining “plainness”—the problem of finding language “plain” to a judge that
would not be “plain” to a member of Congress or might be “plain” in an entirely different way. 193 In interpreting statutes, all statutory interpreters agree that
the standard cannot be the “will of the judge,” but the “will of Congress.” 194
But every judge is faced with the ancient problem of the philosopher in the
189

See H.R. DOC. NO. 112-161.
Bock Laundry, 490 U.S. at 527.
191
See id. at 509–10.
192
Textualists claim that committee reports should not be replied upon because they do not represent the membership as a whole, but only part of Congress.
193
When I assert the possibility of judicial bias, I do not mean that judges are any less biased than
other decisionmakers, simply that everyone is biased toward their own context and against foreign or
unknown contexts. Social psychologists have found, for example, that people as a general rule tend to
attribute social phenomena to individuals rather than the situation. They tend, thus, to fail to focus on
context.
194
GARNER & SCALIA, supra note 175, at xvi–xxviii.
190
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cave: one’s perspective may be darkened to the world, in this case darkened to
the world of Congress. We can never know, ex ante, whether Congress would
have made a decision on a particular text different from the one made by intuitive judicial reflection. As the great contracts scholar Corbin argued, every interpreter uses some extrinsic evidence, even if it is the interpreter’s own life
experience: “[W]hen a judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on
the ground that the meaning of written words is to him plain and clear, his decision is formed by and wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence
of his own personal education and experience.” 195 If this is correct, the only
way to protect against ex ante judicial bias is to look for some kind of check.
We know, for example, that there are famous cases in which the plainness
judgment, at the entextualization stage, was quite wrong. In 1992, in Pepper v.
Hart, decided by the House of Lords, the most famous example of this occurred. 196 The question was how to calculate taxes on fringe benefits: the taxpayer was a teacher who received an educational benefit for his children at his
school. When the case was initially argued, the Lords agreed that the statute
was plain, ruling for the government that “expense incurred” was expense to
the employer for non-employees as opposed to the marginal cost of adding
another student. On reargument, after the Lords looked at Hansard (Parliament’s records), they reversed. Hansard showed that a parliamentary decision
had been made and that decision was precisely the opposite of the apparent
“plain” meaning of the text before looking at the legislative history. Put in other words, legislative context changed the “plain” meaning quite radically, from
a plain meaning against the taxpayer to one for the taxpayer. 197
Textualists might respond that these examples are simply instances of bad
textualism. The Lords in Pepper should have known that the statute’s meaning
was not plain. 198 Likewise, the Supreme Court in Bock Laundry or Holy Trinity
should have known that there were texts in need of reconciliation. 199 This
recognition alone, however, does not provide much help in resolving such cases. Once a judge finds conflicting texts—“labor” and “lecturer” or “witness”
and “defendant”—how are these to be reconciled or interpreted? If the semantic content does not yield a single answer, but points in two directions, then the
195
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statute has no “plain” meaning. Textualists will insist that judicial canons can
be useful in resolving conflicting texts. But it is clear that this is not true in all
cases. It is certainly not true in the ABA case 200 or Pepper. 201 Ex ante, canons
cannot tell one if the text is plain, which text to pick, or how to reconcile contradictory texts.
4. Legislative History and Usage
Finally, even if none of these arguments persuade, textualists should concede that legislative history may be used as evidence of semantic meaning. 202
The congressional record is an extraordinary resource for understanding how
members (presumably English speakers) use words, namely semantic usage.
Nevertheless, once one opens the door to legislative history as a form of usage,
it is difficult to understand why it should not be opened to include Congress’s
decisions on specific texts. Let us assume, in Pepper, that we can find one
hundred uses of the term “benefit” and all of them suggest a narrow definition
supporting a ruling against the taxpayer. If we know, as we do know from the
case, that the government withdrew and opposed that result, then semantic
content becomes a way to replace Parliament’s actual decision with the results
of a strange judicial adventure in semantics.
Usage inquiries suffer from two other significant problems. First, they
depend upon determining the appropriate term in the statute at the “entextualization” stage. If you think that the only relevant term in the Holy Trinity case
is “labor,” for example, your usage inquiry will be skewed, and pointless if you
choose the wrong text. Second, the usage inquiry can distort if it does not look
to the sequence of Congress’s decision. Would it have helped, for example, to
find how Congress used the term “utilized” in the ABA case? In fact, it would
have distorted our best evidence of Congress’s actual decision: the statutory
history showing that “utilized” was added in conference committee.
C. Legislative History and Group Attribution
Now that we have identified different forms of legislative history, with
their vices and virtues, it is possible to consider the issue raised by the first
Part of this Article, which is the degree to which the question of “group” action
should affect the interpretation of legislative context. Elsewhere I have elaborated on the ways in which Congress’s sequential procedures should affect the
reading of legislative history. But once we enter the world of group action it
200
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becomes clear that this is not enough. If we are looking for legislative “context” we should recognize that the context includes the recognition that statutes
are made over time by winners and losers.203 We should also remember that
legislative context must be public action legitimized by “the group.”
If this is correct, it provides an important opportunity to distinguish between legislative context properly attributable to the group and not properly
attributable to the group. For example, courts are skeptical of individual members’ statements as the claims of lone wolves. They should be: members themselves see individual members’ speeches as little more than the reflection of a
particular member’s preferences. On the other hand, the group views some individual statements as performing a larger deliberative function, as when
statements are made by the author of the amendment or manager of the bill. To
be a “manager” or “author” is to assert representative positions of those supporting the bill. Implicit group attribution is part of the common-sense of legislative context. Statements violating the rules or having no ability to persuade
the group (such as remarks inserted after debate) should not be considered
proper group action or proper legislative context. 204 So, for example, in 2006,
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court properly disregarded deceptive
statements made by legislators, just as they would be rejected by members of
Congress as post-hoc attempts to influence the courts.205
This raises questions about items like committee reports, traditionally the
“gold standard” for legislative history. That conventional wisdom deserves
serious rethinking, 206 but not because these reports are the work of a committee
as opposed to the whole (the argument textualists tend to make). Ex ante, the
whole delegates to the committee. In the absence of anything else, the committee report may be the best evidence of meaning of the whole. Members view
the committee report as important on the committee bill, for example. The
problem is the committee bill may bear no resemblance to the statute. If it
turns out the committee bill was significantly amended (as it often is), then an
early committee report may be entirely irrelevant. For example, if the key statutory provision first appears in a compromise substitute created to overcome a
filibuster, then the earlier committee report may have little relevance as it relates to a now-superseded version of the bill.
In sum, there are two kinds of questions we must ask in developing any
complete theory of legislative context. At the wholesale level, the question is
203
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about the group: if there is no group authorization (i.e. post-hoc or deceptive
statements) or no possibility of group attribution (i.e. statements members attribute only to individuals) the legislative context should be rejected without
special justification. At a retail level, however, even if properly authorized, in
any particular case, evidence of legislative context may be irrelevant because
of the statutory sequence and history. As for committee reports, this latter
judgment has become increasingly likely because: (1) the high incidence of the
filibuster means that the bills considered in the Senate are likely to vary quite a
bit from committee bills; and (2) the high incidence of partisanship makes it
more likely that bills will evade the committee altogether.207
CONCLUSION
Textualism and purposivism were created during a century-long period of
legal education marked by “juriscentricity.” 208 In this world, professors taught
and enculturated “students to respect, admire, and emulate the thought, the
knowledge, the wisdom, and even the style of great judges, not great legislators.” 209 By comparison, the great statutes of the twentieth century, which liberated entire peoples (namely blacks and women and the disabled and the
aged) became a kind of “faux law,” or lower law, the work of usurpers too stupid to understand “higher” constitutional law, and motivated only by the selfinterest of “uninformed [and] hate-filled constituents.” 210 No wonder there are
no courses on congressional procedure and no wonder no one knows about
Rule XXII, the cloture rule, or that the Senate requires a supermajority to pass
all legislation.
The good news is that all this is beginning to change, albeit after a century of calls for its change. Recent scholarship is full of new and important work
revealing that the juriscentric focus has given us a rather skewed view of the
legislative process. Professors Gluck and Bressman have shown that, contrary
to what some judges assume, drafters do not know canons. 211 Professor Parillo
has explained that the idea of legislative history was constructed by post-New
Deal administrative lawyers for their state-building purposes. 212 Professor
207
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Eskridge has perfected his pathbreaking study on congressional overrides of
judicial statutory interpretation,213 showing how and when Congress is likely
to respond to judges’ interpretive errors. This new scholarship reflects the urgent need to reverse the gravitational pull of juriscentricity, the need to aim our
efforts away from how judges think we should interpret statutes to how Congress and the President make statutes.
If this is right, it is time to move beyond the great debates about legislative intent, and to elevate Congress to the position of group agent. To speak of
Congress as having or not having an “intent” has become something of a slur.
As if, unlike courts, Congress does not have the commitment to make a decision or acts in ways that hover in mental ether rather than in public. We know,
of course, that the GI Bill, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and the Violence Against Women Act are quite durable, having helped change a nation. And yet lawyers are quite comfortable treating
these statutes as something lower in the most banal of discursive methods, by
reducing them to bits of text or fleeting intents. My point is not to valorize
Congress. A group agent is only as good as the procedures it adopts. When
searching for Congress’s meaning, we must attend to that context and not let
ourselves be deceived by the conventional connotations of the terms legislative
“intent” or “history.”
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